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Abstract 
Individuals of all ages are often confronted with situations varying in their complexity and 
situational characteristics. Normal aging is associated with changes in cognitive capacities such 
as learning and memory but also notable alterations in physical fitness, health, and the social 
environment. These changes most likely affect not only the necessary cognitive tools but also the 
perception of gains and losses in relation to available resources and personal goals when making 
decisions. This dissertation shows that age differences in decision making cannot be understood 
without considering the fit between the individual resources and the characteristics of the choice 
environment. It comprises three papers studying the effect of aging on the propensity to take risks 
as well as one paper on inference decisions in choice ecologies that differ in memory demand. 
The first paper investigates longitudinal changes in risk-taking propensity across the life 
span. It shows that the propensity to take risks varies as a function of age and domain. 
Interestingly, different conceptions of change suggest that risk-taking propensity has trait-like 
properties similar to those found in major personality traits such as the Big Five. The second 
paper studies the psychological mechanisms of age- and domain-differences in risk-taking 
propensity. It finds that individual differences in the perceptions of costs and benefits, but not 
control beliefs, account for the prominent age-related but domain-variant change in risk-taking 
propensity. The third paper presents a cross-cultural investigation of life span changes in risk-
taking propensity. It suggests that age-related changes in risk taking are associated with local 
characteristics: Countries in which hardship (i.e., homicide rate, gross domestic product, 
income/gender inequality) is largest show least changes in risk-taking propensity over the life 
span. Finally, the fourth paper summarizes empirical studies on the effects of memory demand on 
age differences in inference decisions. It displays that individual memory ability is crucial for the 
maintenance of adequate decision outcomes in choice environments that pose high demands on 
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memory. Overall, these findings emphasize that in order to predict life span changes in decision 
making, one needs to take the interaction between the individual and the environment into 
account. Developmental phenomena such as changes in decision making can be understood as 
individual efforts to adapt one’s performance to both internal and external changes such as in the 
environment surrounding them or their own motivations and cognitive capacity. 
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General Introduction 
The populations of nations around the globe are aging. In developed societies, life 
expectancy is rising by an average of 2.5 years per decade, and there is no visible end to this 
trend (Vaupel, 2010). An inevitable consequence of the growing life span is that an expanding 
number of elderly people will be forced to work longer and will therefore have an increasing 
responsibility to make decisions affecting their own as well as the well-being of others. Financial 
decisions of older investors, for example, now have a higher impact on the global economy than 
ever before (Agarwal, Driscoll, Gabaix, & Laibson, 2009; Gamble, Boyle, Yu & Bennett, 2014). 
In everyday life, we are often confronted with situations which are varying in their 
cognitive demand or that involve some degree of risk or uncertainty. Many times, decision 
environments are complex, involve risks and/or pose extensive demands on dwindling cognitive 
resources such as memory ability. Thus, it remains a lifelong endeavor to adapt to different 
situational demands in order to make good decisions and to uphold the own wellbeing in domains 
as diverse as health, pensions, and interpersonal relationships. How do older adults deal with the 
constant cognitive demands in our decision environments? How do changes that come along with 
aging alter goals and motivations that, eventually, determine changes driving our preferences and 
behavior? Understanding how aging affects decision making is an essential field of research, 
which is important for policy makers that aim to uphold the overall welfare of our aging societies. 
 
Life Span Theories on Human Development 
Human development – from young up to older ages – comprises constant 
multidimensional changes and lifelong adaptive processes to internal biological, cognitive as well 
as external changes in the environment (Baltes & Baltes, 1990; Carstensen, 1995). It entails the 
constant interplay of often opposing and simultaneous changes in these resources – trajectories of 
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growth (i.e. gains, such as the acquisition of a language) and decline (i.e. losses, age-related 
decline in physical fitness). Some dimensions of development may expand while others shrink as 
individuals develop. For example, when children enter elementary school, they may learn new 
strategies to solve more sophisticated intellectual problems, but at the same time lose the ability 
to get completely lost in play. While young age is mostly characterized by the acquisition of new 
skills, older age is associated with sizable decreases in cognitive capacities such as memory and 
learning ability (Chasseigne, Ligneau, & Grau, 2003; Eppinger, Hämmerer, & Li, 2011; 
Lindenberger, 2014) but also notable alterations in physical fitness, health, and in the social 
environment (Fredrickson & Carstensen, 1990; Cartensen, 1995; Carstensen, Isaakowitz, & 
Charles, 1999; Salthouse, 2010). Therefore, with age, losses in many different types of 
developmental resources gradually overweigh present gains. As a result, older adults shift away 
from behavior supporting the allocation of resources and gains. Instead, they switch to behavior 
that balances the maintenance of a normal level of functioning in face of losses. This motivation 
may differ depending on the domain of functioning or the task at hand. Understanding 
developmental changes in actions and behavior thus means identifying age-related changes in 
individuals, their environments, and their interaction. 
The Selective Optimization with Compensation theory (SOC; Baltes & Baltes, 1990) 
predicts how individuals adapt to evident changes in their resources. It distinguishes between 
several pathways of developmental regulation tailored to uphold continuing growth and adequate 
levels of functioning in the face of impeding or present age-related losses: Selection, 
optimization, and compensation. Selection refers to the adaptation and limitation to behaviors and 
domains in which to allocate personal resources. For example, deciding to cease taking risks in 
challenging recreational activities can prevent the negative experience of physical harm in such 
situations. Optimization describes a shift in focus towards the maximization of gains to increase 
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positive emotions and the own well-being. With increasing age, for instance, older people put 
relatively more weight to emotionally meaningful goals, activities, emotional satisfaction, and 
their interpersonal relationships (Carstensen, 1995; Carstensen et al., 1999). Compensation 
implies changing the ways to acquire personal goals such that they match the changed internal or 
external resources. For instance, when it becomes increasingly difficult to remember several 
items, older people may shift from internal memory strategies to external aids (i.e., a shopping 
list). Taken together, successful aging requires people to orchestrate their available resources by 
applying these mechanisms in face of the challenges and demands produced by different 
environments. 
 
Life Span Development of Decision Making 
Decision making is the study of how individuals identify and choose among several 
alternatives based on individual values and preferences. Decisions can take place in a multitude 
of different choice environments. For example, financial decisions about retirement investments 
or health decisions about drugs with possible side effects are risky because they can result in 
either gains or losses. Moreover, many choice environments are complex because they pose 
extensive demands on memory and learning ability. That is, in many decision situations relevant 
information is not conveniently presented but needs to be recalled from memory. How does aging 
change the way individuals make decisions in these situations? What factors determine decisions 
in one situation opposed to another? Answers to these questions are crucial for building an 
understanding of the life span development of decision making. 
The concept of ecological rationality makes predictions about how individuals make 
decisions in different choice environments. According to this perspective, there is no domain-
general answer to how age-related changes affect decision making (Gigerenzer, Todd, & The 
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ABC Research Group, 1999; Mata, Pachur, von Helversen, Hertwig, Rieskamp, & Schooler, 
2012). The impact of age-related changes depends strongly on the characteristics of the choice 
environment and how these interact with the resources and goals of the decision maker. Such 
characteristics can operate on different levels and can present themselves as both qualitative 
differences/demands between life domains, such as decisions concerning health, financial or 
social issues, and via the cognitive affordances of a specific decision task (e.g. memory). With 
respect to what we have learned about the SOC approach to human development, this means that 
changes brought about by aging may affect regulatory processes and likely become evident in 
decision making. To better understand age-related changes in decision making, one needs to take 
into account the characteristics of the choice environment. 
This dissertation framework summarizes work covering empirical investigations of age-
related changes in decision making. It adopts an ecological rational perspective and views the 
findings reported as the result of the fit between the individual, its resources, and the choice 
environment. The first section summarizes life span changes in the propensity to take risks and 
summarizes three manuscripts. The second part summarizes empirical investigations of the role 
of memory demand for adult age differences in decision making and summarizes one manuscript. 
 
Part I – The Propensity for Risk Taking Across the Life Span  
One prominent characterization of risk-taking propensity is the tendency of an individual 
to engage in behavior that bears the chance of losses (e.g. physical harm) as well as gains (e.g. 
excitement). An important debate in psychology concerns the issue of whether an individual’s 
risk taking is stable across choice domains or whether it is heavily influenced by situational 
characteristics (Schoemaker, 1993; Yechiam & Ert, 2011). Several theoretical frameworks make 
predictions about stability and changes in risk taking across the life span as well as its domain-
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specificity. 
 First, trait views of risk taking favor domain-general patterns of age differences in risk 
taking. That is, risk-taking propensity is conceptualized as a domain-general construct which is 
biologically determined and, thus, potentially generalizable across domains. Results of behavioral 
genetics studies suggest that risk taking has substantial and reliable genetic underpinnings, with 
heritability estimates based on twin studies ranging between 20% and 60% of variance explained 
(Anokhin, Golosheykin, Grant, & Heat, 2009; Cesarini, Dawes, Johannesson, Lichtenstein, 
Sandewall, & Wallace, 2009). Similarly, some personality theories in psychology have 
characterized risk-taking propensity as a trait that shows stable relative differences between 
individuals across multiple measurement points spanning years (Steinberg, 2008; Zuckermann & 
Kuhlman, 2000). However, the conception of risk taking as a trait does not imply that it cannot 
change over time. General personality traits with moderate rank stability, such as openness to 
new experiences, show reliable mean-level change (e.g., decline) across adult life (Roberts, 
Walton, & Viechtbauer, 2006). Such changes are also consistent with behavioral ecology’s 
conception of risk. From this viewpoint, risk taking can be seen as a behavioral strategy or 
functional adaptation to an individual’s current state (Sih & Del Guidice, 2012). In young 
adulthood, for example, risk behaviors are instrumental in gaining access to potential mating 
partners via resource control and status. Consequently, risky behaviors can be expected to be 
more prevalent among young males (Daly & Wilson, 1997) who face higher reproductive 
competition than young females. Later in the life cycle, on the contrary, individuals place higher 
value on other objectives such as guarding their own lives because the offspring’s survival 
depends on parental and in particular maternal care, and defense (Campbell, 1999). In addition, 
risk taking should be particularly pronounced among those young individuals who have lower 
expectations about the future (Wolf, von Doorn, Leimar, & Weissing, 2007), lower life 
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expectancy (Wilson & Daly, 1997), and that live in more competitive environments (Belsky, 
Schlomer, & Ellis, 2012). 
In contrast to trait views, cross-situational conceptions of risk taking emphasize its 
domain-specific nature. According to these approaches, risk taking can differ considerably across 
domains because of the different costs and rewards associated with specific risk ecologies (Blais 
& Weber, 2006). In other words, inter- and intra-individual differences in risk-taking propensity 
may stem from varying perceptions of costs and benefits across domains and time. For example, 
life span changes in cognitive ability (Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, & Sunde, 2009) and affective 
experience (Carstensen, 2006) could impact how the benefits and costs of risk-taking behavior 
are perceived (Peters, Hess, Västfjäll, & Aumann, 2007). Moreover, it is possible that risk taking 
remains necessary or attractive across the life span in some domains, translating into domain-
specific trajectories of risk propensity with some showing steeper decline than others. For 
example, while individuals may be willing to forego certain risky activities with increasing age–
such as reckless driving–other forms, such as interpersonal exchange associated with social 
support may become increasingly needed across the life span. This multi-faceted and flexible 
interplay between an individual’s age and her propensity to take risks may constitute an adaptive 
strategy: It avoids unnecessary harm thus managing and maintaining physical well being and 
health when physical losses in some domains are accumulating (Baltes & Baltes, 1990). 
Which perspective is correct? Can risk-taking propensity be thought of as a trait that 
captures individual differences across domains and over time? Or alternatively, is risk taking a 
domain-specific response pattern that varies systematically with age and in different choice 
ecologies? 
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Stability and Change of Risk-Taking Propensity in Different Life Domains 
Josef, A. K., Richter, D., Samanez-Larkin, G. R., Wagner, G. G., Hertwig, R. & Mata, R. (2016). 
Stability and change in risk-taking propensity across the adult life span. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology. Advance online publication. 
doi:10.1037/pspp0000090 
 
Several conceptually and empirically distinct approaches to study stability and changes in 
personality traits may help to answer these questions: First, differential stability refers to the 
consistency of rank ordering of individuals over time. High differential stability is supportive for 
high individual trait stability. Key personality traits (i.e. the Big Five) show considerable rank-
order stability but low levels of stability in youngest and oldest ages (Briley & Tucker-Drob, 
2014; Roberts & DelVeccio, 2000). Second, mean-level stability refers to the consistency in the 
average level of traits across the life span and reflects the general pattern of change for large 
numbers of individuals. For example, average levels of personality traits such as openness to 
experiences and extraversion have shown reliable decreases with age (Lucas & Donnellan, 2011; 
Roberts, et al., 2006; Specht, Egloff, & Schmukle, 2011). Third, individual-level stability refers 
to the consistency of a trait at the level of the individual person. Correlated changes of several 
variables can be helpful to understand mechanisms of change and to gather greater insight into 
the individual dynamics of the development of a trait. 
The first manuscript analyzed data from a large and representative longitudinal data set of 
respondents aged 18 to 85 years obtained from the German Socioeconomic Panel Study (SOEP, 
www.leibnitz-soep.de). The survey included a question on general risk-taking propensity in nine 
waves of assessment spanning 10 years. Six questions on risk-taking propensity in different life 
domains (i.e., financial, driving, recreational, occupational, health, and social) were included in 
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three waves each five years apart. Two behavioral experiments, a monetary gamble task and a 
trust game were assessed in one year of the panel study each. We analyzed general and domain-
specific risk-taking propensity (N > 40,000 and N > 11,000) as well as behavioral measures of 
social and nonsocial risk taking (N = 646 and N = 433) to test the different conceptions of change 
used in the personality literature and the convergence of findings in self-report and behavioral 
measures of risk. 
The results suggest that risk-taking propensity has characteristics similar to a personality 
trait that is subject to change. First, the relative stability of risk-taking propensity is very similar 
to that of major personality variables (i.e., the Big Five). Across all domains investigated, the 
stability followed an inverted U-shaped pattern with lowest stability estimates in very young and 
older ages. Second, we showed that individual-level change over time is significantly associated 
with individual-level changes in the Big Five but not with changes in income. Positive 
associations were observed between within-person change in extraversion and openness to 
experiences with risk-taking propensity; negative associations were present between within-
person change in conscientiousness, neuroticism, and agreeableness and within-person changes in 
risk-taking propensity. Third, the results for mean-level changes echo the results reported by 
previous studies in showing that aging, albeit differences in the life domain trajectories, reduces 
self-reported risk-taking propensity. These findings also coincide with studies showing that the 
average levels of personality traits such as openness to experiences, or extraversion decrease with 
age. Interestingly, risk-taking propensity in the social domain showed to be relatively stable 
across the life span. The pattern obtained for social and financial risk-taking propensity matched 
that obtained from cross-sectional data of behavioral measures of the monetary gamble task 
(financial) and the trust game (social). The correlations between self- reports and behavioral 
measures of risk were, however, very small. These results have important implications for the 
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conception of risk taking, in general, but also for the measurement validity of behavioral and self-
report measures for the construct of risk. Most notably, despite the strong associations in the 
characteristics of change between risk-taking propensity and the Big Five personality traits, the 
domain-specific mean-level changes pose the question of what could be potential (psychological) 
mechanisms behind these different trajectories. 
 
Psychological Mechanisms of Life Span Changes in Risk-Taking Propensity 
Josef, A. K., Drewelies, J., Hertwig, R., & Mata, R. (2016). Age differences in risk-taking 
propensity are related to perceptions of risk and reward but not perceived control. 
Working paper. 
 
The results of the first manuscript resonate well with previous work which showed that, 
on average, the life span trajectories of risk-taking propensities vary significantly as a function of 
the life domain investigated (e.g. Rolison, Hanoch, Wood, & Liu, 2013). The steepest declines 
were found in recreational and occupational risk-taking propensity while the declines were least 
pronounced in financial, health, and social risk-taking propensity. What are the psychological 
mechanisms behind these domain- and age-differences? According to the risk-return approach of 
risk taking, individual and domain-differences in risk taking are a function of psychological 
variables such as how people perceive the costs and its benefits of risk taking (Hanoch, Johnson, 
& Wilke, 2006; Weber, Blais, & Betz, 2002). For example, previous research showed that 
women take fewer risks compared to men because they perceive risk costs to be higher and risk 
gains to be lower. Since aging is associated with a general decline in resources (i.e. experienced 
cognitive decline, reductions in physical fitness and decreases in social network size), 
experiencing such decline likely alters the perceptions of costs and benefits of risks in different 
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domains of life (Bonem, Ellsworth, & Gonzalez, 2015). Moreover, older adults may sense a 
concurrent decline in perceived control, especially in those domains of life that are most affected 
by these changes and adjust their level of risk taking accordingly. The second manuscript 
investigated the role of risk perceptions (costs and benefits) and control beliefs for age- and 
domain-specific changes in risk-taking propensities. 
The manuscript used cross-section data from an independent representative sample of the 
German population (N = 1,786) between 20 and 75 years of age. In addition to the risk-taking 
propensity items used in the German Socioeconomic Panel, the survey assessed separate items on 
risk perception, expected benefits, and control beliefs in the six life domains (i.e., financial, 
driving, recreational, occupational, health, and social). The results replicate the prominent age-
related and domain-specific decline in risk-taking propensity. Strongest age-related declines were 
found in the recreational, occupational domain, and in car driving while the weakest declines 
were found in health, financial, and social risk-taking propensity. Further, the results suggest that 
measures of risk perception and expected benefits, but not control beliefs, account for this 
prominent decline. These results make important advances in understanding the psychological 
mechanisms behind age-related and domain-specific changes in the propensity to take risks.  
 
Cross-Cultural Differences in Life Span Changes in Risk-Taking Propensity  
Mata, R., Josef, A., & Hertwig, R. (2016). Propensity for risk taking across the life span and 
around the globe. Psychological Science. Advance online publication. doi: 
10.1177/0956797615617811 
 
Viewed from a life history point of view, risk taking can be considered a trait that serves a 
functional role (i.e. an adaptation to internal or external changes of the individual) and that is 
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genetically determined. That is, risk taking can be seen in terms of a reproductive strategy which 
is more prominent among males than females and more prevalent among younger relative to 
older individuals (Wilson & Daly, 1997). Moreover, changes may occur as a function of 
ecological circumstances, such as the level of harshness in an environment. Especially 
environments in which available resources are scare and that are therefore associated with 
increased competition, may force individuals to choose risk taking as a survival strategy. 
Similarly, research in personality literature reports significant variation in personality 
development as a function of the timing of normative life events in different countries (Bleidorn 
et al., 2013). That is, personality development at least partly results from people’s experience 
with local ecologies. Is the prominent decline in risk-taking propensity across the adult life span a 
universal phenomenon? Or, alternatively, do local characteristics such as the level of hardship 
influence the relationship between age and risk taking? 
Manuscript three is based on cross-sectional survey data of 77 countries (N = 147,118) 
around the globe from the World Value Survey (www.worldvaluesurvey.org). The survey 
included one (domain-general) item on individual risk-taking propensity. To capture exposure to 
hardship in each country, we computed a composite measure of homicide rate, gross domestic 
product, income equality, infant mortality, life expectancy at birth, and gender equality. The 
results show that in the majority of countries investigated, risk-taking propensity declines with 
age. However, there was also a significant variation of the shape of change with some countries 
showing steeper declines than others. Importantly, the measure of hardship for each country 
correlated with the steepness of decline in risk-taking propensity across the life span. In countries 
in which resources are scare the age-related decline was least pronounced. These results are 
consistent with life history theory, which predicts that risk taking is an essential strategy for 
survival and reproduction in harsh environments, and is so, irrespective of age. They are also in 
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line with an ecological perspective on personality development and risk taking as a trait that 
shows substantial adaptations to environmental characteristics across the life span. 
Interim Summary  
The research described has important implications for theories of risk taking. First, 
manuscript one suggests that risk taking can be considered a trait with a level of rank-order 
stability across individuals that is only slightly below that of major personality dimensions. That 
is, the pattern reported echo the inverted U-curved pattern of stability from young to old 
adulthood that has been reported for major personality factors. Risk-taking propensity is least 
stable in very young and older ages. This trajectory is largely consistent with the idea that 
personality traits are shaped by life experiences. Lower stability is to be expected in 
developmental periods involving significant biological, cognitive, and social changes/demands. 
Second, manuscript one and two demonstrate that, on average, risk-taking propensity 
declines over the life span. The shape of change, however, is domain-dependent. Interestingly, 
the social domain showed to be relatively stable across the life span. These results are consistent 
with Socioemotional Selectivity Theory (Carstensen, 1995). This life span theory of motivation 
makes predictions about social and emotional involvement across the life span. It supports the 
notion that as time horizons shrink with age, individuals choose to invest more resources into 
emotionally meaningful goals and behaviors. For example, past research has shown that social 
and emotional information remains prioritized with respect to broader life goals across adulthood 
(Carstensen et al., 1999). In addition, despite their decreasing social network size, there is 
evidence that older individuals continue to be socially engaged more frequently and more 
emotionally with their closest relationships compared to younger adults (Fredrickson & 
Carstensen, 1990). Manuscript two makes one step towards the investigation of qualitative 
differences between the domains and the found life span trajectories and shows that individual 
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and age-related changes in perceptions of costs and benefits of risky behavior can act as 
psychological mechanisms behind the prominent decreases. This is in accordance with ideas on 
life span development in general and the idea that a change in the balance of gains and losses 
concerning the own resources may translate into psychological perceptions of risk taking in 
different life domains. 
Third, manuscript one finds associations between individual-level changes in major 
personality traits and individual-level changes in risk-taking propensity but no associations 
between changes in situational variables such as income. That is, individual increases in 
extraversion and openness to experiences showed to increase individual risk-taking propensity. 
Increases in conscientiousness, neuroticism, and agreeableness, in turn, were associated with 
decreases in individual risk-taking propensity. Correlations of individual-level change in income 
did not show to have substantial influence on individual-level changes in risk-taking propensity 
over time. Thus, on the individual level, changes in personality show stronger associations with 
risk-taking propensity than changes in the economic circumstances such as income. 
Lastly, manuscript three presents efforts towards a global perspective on the development 
of risk-taking propensity by investigating its cross-cultural variations. We can show that the 
correlation between age and risk-taking propensity varies across different countries and that this 
variation is a function of the affordances of the local ecologies. These findings are in line with 
results from personality psychology reporting that personality development is a product of 
experience with the characteristics of the local ecologies. The relationship between age and risk 
seems to reflect an individuals’ adjustment to the characteristics of local ecologies and cannot be 
understood without reference to the demands and affordances of the environment. 
Overall, these results suggest that risk taking is not a purely situation-specific response 
pattern. Instead, it should be considered a trait-like construct that is consistent in different settings 
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and that changes as a function of its functional role in different environments across the life span. 
 
What Remains Open – Important Questions for Future Research 
 
The Relationship Between Risk-Taking Propensity And Personality 
Regrettably, the developments of risk-taking tendencies and personality traits have long 
been investigated separately, including sensation seeking and impulsivity. The work summarized 
here makes important advances in understanding the relationship between the two constructs. 
Next, I will address a few ideas for future research that will inspire both further theoretical and 
empirical work on the link between the development of personality and risk taking. 
The Early Origins of Individual Risk-Taking Propensity 
Personality research reports that differences in temperament and behavioral tendencies 
between children are already evident in very early stages of their lives. In particular, behavioral 
styles at the age of 3 years were found to be predictive of self-reports on personality at the age of 
18 years in the largest longitudinal study on this issue to date (Caspi & Silva, 1995). Children 
that were impulsive, restless, and distractible at the age of 3 years were also those that were 
reckless, careless, and that favored dangerous and exciting activities at the age of 18 years. Our 
work shows parallels between risk-taking propensity and major personality traits such as 
openness to experiences and extraversion, among others. The developmental origins of risk-
taking propensity, however, are only poorly understood. Future work may profit from examining 
the stability of early facets of risk taking propensity in children up until young adulthood. 
Further, studying the development of risk-taking propensities from early childhood will allow 
investigating the mechanisms of change in risk taking such as intergenerational (genetic) 
transmission of attitudes from parents to children as well as their social mechanisms such as 
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learning from the family and social environment (Dohmen, Falk, Huffman & Sunde, 2012; 
Necker & Voskort, 2014; Zumbuehl, Dohmen, & Pfann, 2013). 
Factors Moderating Continuity and Change in Risk-Taking Propensity 
In order to properly understand developmental processes in risk-taking propensity across 
the life span, it is essential to further examine the mechanisms of processes of change. Existing 
literature on personality development has identified several factors that may be worth 
investigating in relation to developmental processes in risk-taking propensity. For example, major 
life events include normative transitions in life (e.g. puberty, first job, marriage), meaningful 
changes (e.g. birth of a child), or major unexpected individual life events (e.g. unemployment, 
death of a family member). There is evidence that such events invoke changes in personality 
(Specht et al., 2011). Likewise, previous work has shown that macroeconomic events like 
economic crisis and floods provoke differences in risk taking beyond the effect of age 
(Berlemann, Steinhardt, & Tutt, 2015; Malmendier & Nagel, 2011). We show that individual 
stability of risk-taking propensity in different life domains is lowest in very young and old ages. 
One reason for this overt change in risk-taking propensity may be that these phases in life are 
most affected by the transitions and life events described above. If such events are major catalysts 
of personality change one further step within the study of life span development of risk-taking 
propensity will be the investigation of their effect on individual risk-taking propensity. In 
particular, it will be interesting to see whether the influence of such events tears apart preexisting 
individual differences more dramatically or alternatively, makes individuals become more alike. 
Late Life Development of Risk-Taking Propensity: The Role of Distance to Death 
A substantial body of evidence suggests that most pronounced declines in cognitive 
abilities, perceptual-motor speed, and crystallized are related to imminent death. For example, 
respondents who died within one year after assessment showed steeper decline in an investigation 
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on life satisfaction relative to the others (Mroczek & Spiro, 2005). Time and time perception is an 
important component of many everyday life decisions because outcomes are not only uncertain 
but also take time to materialize. Socioemotional Selectivity Theory makes predictions about how 
the perception of time alters the selection and pursuit of social goals (Carstensen et al., 1999). 
That is, when time is perceived as limited, emotional goals are prioritized. Distance to death may 
thus constitute a further variable of interest worth investigating in relation to longitudinal changes 
in risk-taking propensity. Are individual differences in change in risk-taking propensity over time 
best described by chronological age or by distance to death? Is the rate of change influenced by 
distance to death? Are individual differences in changes related to real-world risk factors such as 
previous illnesses, extraordinary causes of death (e.g. car accidents), or even longevity? 
 
Qualitative Differences Between Risk Ecologies 
Adaptive Selection of Risk Environments 
One robust finding is that aging reduces risk-taking propensity. The shape of change, 
however, varies as a function of life domain. More work is needed to provide further theoretical 
rationales for potential qualitative differences between the life domains investigated. One 
possibility for the evident domain-specific trajectories is that there are some domains or risky 
activities that can be avoided in different phases of life. For example, abstaining from climbing 
ladders or standing on chairs can reduce the risk of falls at home and may be an adaptive strategy 
in older age. It avoids unnecessary harm thus managing and maintaining physical well-being and 
health when physical losses in some domains are accumulating (Baltes & Baltes, 1990). This is 
consistent with the SOC theory, which predicts that individuals select environments or tasks in 
response to changes in their own resources. Going forward, studies that investigate specific risk-
taking behaviors and assess the causes underlying the adoption or cessation of these behaviors 
The Life Span Development of Decision Making 24 
across adulthood are warranted. Another promising avenue for research is to investigate 
systematic differences in age-related stereotypes and beliefs that are widespread in the population 
and can lead to systematic differences in behavior of older adults between domains (Konradt, & 
Rothermund, 2011). 
Recall Processes of Self-Report Measures of Risk 
Further work is necessary to understand the representations and associated retrieval 
processes that lead to the observed patterns of mean-level age differences in self-reported risk-
taking propensity. Past research suggests that one can conceptualize elicited preferences as the 
output of human memory representations that contain knowledge related to these preferences. 
The preferences-as-memory (PAM) approach, for example, suggests that preferences are the 
product of the retrieval of relevant knowledge (attitudes, attributes, previous preferences, 
episodes, or events) from memory in an online fashion (Weber & Johnson, 2006). According to 
such views, factors such as the accessibility or the representativeness of specific risky behaviors 
can largely impact which information is retrieved from memory. Similarly, specific prompts or 
behaviors may prime memory retrieval that could lead to quite different patterns of self-reported 
risk taking in a given domain, or associated perceived costs and benefits depending on the age 
group investigated. When older adults reflect on risk taking in the recreational domain they think 
of long hikes in the forest, younger adults, in turn, think about extreme sports such as bungee 
jumping or cave diving. 
Aging and Social Decision Making/Preferences 
Our findings are likely to inspire new research on topics that have received relatively less 
attention like age differences in social decision making. In comparison to most other domains, 
social risk taking does not seem to undergo systematic age-related changes across the adult life 
span. This was also mirrored in the results on the trust game. These results are consistent with 
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previous work showing relatively stable levels of trust from young to older ages (Rieger & Mata, 
2013; Sutter & Kocher, 2007) and recent research showing a link between wisdom and age-
related changes in economic and social decision making (Lim & Yu, 2015). Further work is 
needed to expand these results to obtain a more general statement on the effect of aging on social 
(risk) preferences. In particular, it would be interesting to summarize experimental evidence on 
social behavior and aging in relation to risk taking more extensively. To date, there is no 
systematic review of age differences in related measures such as donation behavior, altruism, 
public goods games, cooperation, dictator games, perceptions of trustworthiness, or prosocial 
behavior. Naturally, these research questions can be expanded to cross-cultural investigations to 
test whether especially social preferences differ depending on the culture and their value of 
(pro)social behavior. 
 
Investigating the Link to Real-World Behavior 
The work summarized is based on self-reports and does not allow investigating the links 
between risk preferences and real-world outcomes such as investment data or individual health 
status. To our knowledge, there has only been one past effort to use one wave of the SOEP 
database to predict real-world behavior in the financial domain (Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, Sunde, 
Schupp, & Wagner, 2011) but these efforts could be extended to include other waves of the 
SOEP. A limitation of both past work and any future efforts with these data will be that they do 
not include objective measures of respondents’ real-world behavior. The SOEP, for instance, 
relies almost exclusively on self-report assessments of behavior rather than on observational or 
registry data. Recent studies have shown the feasibility of complementing self-report assessments 
with objective real-world assessments, such as health markers (Moffitt et al., 2011) or financial 
reports (Li et al., 2015). Future work with large representative longitudinal surveys should 
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therefore combine self-report and behavioral measures with objective measures of risk-taking 
behavior, such as those associated with financial, health, recreational, occupational, or social 
behavior. 
 
Empirical Associations Between Behavioral And Self-Report Measures 
Further work is necessary to marshal the construct validity of risk taking. Convergent 
validity is the extent to which a measure correlates with other measures of the same construct. It 
is advanced by the empirical convergence of findings using different measurements as well as 
their empirical associations. Manuscript one finds that there are parallels between the trajectories 
of the self-report measures and the two behavioral measures. Specifically, the decline in self-
reported risk-taking propensity in the financial domain was matched by behavior in the monetary 
gamble. Similarly, a relatively flat trajectory of risk-taking propensity in the self-reported social 
domain matched results obtained from the behavioral trust game. However, the cross-sectional 
correlations between self-report and behavioral results were small. Naturally, the small 
correlations between behavioral and self-report measures of trust could stem from confounds 
present in the specific behavioral games used, such as the trust game, because factors such as 
mentalizing abilities and altruistic preferences may trump or confound the role of risk-taking 
preferences (Rilling & Sanfey, 2011). More broadly, although our work raises the possibility that 
both self-report and behavioral measures capture similar aspects of mean-level changes in risk-
taking propensity with increased age, further work is needed to quantify the overlap between the 
different measures (see Appelt, Milch, Handgraaf, & Weber). 
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Part II – Adult Age-Differences in Decision Making: The Role of Memory Demand 
In everyday life, we often must make decisions in which some or all information is not 
available in the environment but rather needs to be recalled from memory. Therefore, the ability 
to encode, bind, and retrieve information specific to decision alternatives is often crucial for 
choosing the best among several options. 
Our cognitive system undergoes systematic and profound changes across the life span 
(Lindenberger, 2014). Especially old age is characterized by decreases in cognition, in particular, 
cognitive control and memory functioning (Hoyer & Verhaeghen, 2006; Light, 1991). 
Specifically, the ability to create and retrieve links between single units of information undergoes 
substantial and continuous decreases with age (Cowan, Naveh-Benjamin, Kilb, & Saults, 2006; 
Naveh-Benjamin, 2000). Cognitive control mechanisms, essential for the upholding, strategic 
selection and evaluation of relevant information also follow a declining developmental trajectory 
(Shing, Werkle-Bergner, Li, & Lindenberger, 2008). 
The link between memory and decision making has long been discussed, but what are 
potential effects of developmental changes of this essential cognitive ability on decision making 
as we grow older? Concurrent literature is consistent in showing that adult age differences in 
decision making performance are a function of the cognitive demands of the decision situation 
with generally lower levels of decision performance of older relative to younger adults (e.g. 
Bruine de Bruin, Parker, & Fischhoff, 2010; Finucane, Mertz, Slovic, & Schmidt, 2005). These 
deficits are most pronounced in decision situations that are cognitively demanding, such as when 
options’ values have to be extracted and learned from feedback or when any pieces of 
information are presented (Finucance et al., 2005; Frey, Mata, & Hertwig, 2015; Henninger, 
Madden, & Huettel, 2010). As a result, limitations in memory ability may especially constrain the 
tools necessary for competent decision making in decision tasks with high memory demand 
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because such situations pose additional cognitive load when previously learnt information has to 
be retrieved from memory (Bröder & Schiffer, 2003; 2006; Peters et al., 2007; Yoon, Cole, & 
Lee, 2009). 
The idea that individuals possess a set of different strategies to solve cognitive tasks is 
proposed in research on memory (Touron, 2015), arithmetic (Siegler & Lemaire, 1997), and 
decision making (Beach & Mitchell, 1978; Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996; Payne, Bettman, & 
Johnson, 1988). The prerequisite is that individuals select decision strategies that are adapted to 
the demands of the task and their own cognitive capacities (Mata et al., 2012). This selection 
process constitutes a cost-benefit tradeoff between the accuracy of a strategy for the decision 
problem at hand and the effort associated with its execution. Previous research has shown that 
individuals are sensitive to a number of task characteristics such as time pressure and memory 
demands (Bröder & Schiffer, 2003), among others, and select decision strategies accordingly. 
Increasing memory demand has especially been associated with the selection of simpler decision 
strategies that are less cognitively demanding. It follows that one way to compensate for 
increasing age-related memory decline can be a shift in the tools or strategies selected such that 
they match changed internal resources (Gigerenzer, 2003). For example, when tasks with high 
memory demand tend to become more difficult with age, older adults switch to simpler, less 
cognitively demanding decision strategies to reduce cognitive load (Mata, Schooler, & Rieskamp, 
2007). 
 
How Memory Demand Influences Decision Accuracy and Strategy Selection 
Josef, A. K., Kellen, D., Pachur, T., Hertwig, R., & Mata, R. (2016). How cognitive aging affects 
decision making under increased memory demands. Working paper. 
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Manuscript four comprises two studies that directly tested the effect of memory demands 
on adult age differences in decision making. To do this, a group of young and older adults was 
engaged in a personnel selection scenario in which they first learnt cue information about five 
different job candidates. Later then, they made decisions in a context in which consideration of 
all information was necessary for high decision performance. To vary memory demands, 
decisions were based on information retrieval from memory (high memory demand), or on 
information displayed in front of the decision maker (low memory demand). With this design, we 
were able to test the following hypotheses: First, older adults’ decisions reach a lower level of 
accuracy than younger adults and the former rely more on simpler strategies than the latter. Both 
effects occur most strongly when demands on memory are high and when decision making 
demands a high degree of self-initiated processing in memory. Second, individuals’ differential 
memory (i.e. associative and working memory ability) is a key element in the occurrence of 
individual and age differences in performance when tasks strongly call upon memory. 
The results show that older adults’ decisions, relative to those of younger adults, were 
most compromised when demands on memory were high. Age differences in decision making 
were relatively small under low memory demands when information was displayed on the screen. 
Individual differences in memory ability mediated the relationship between age, memory 
demand, and decision performance. These findings are in line with findings reported in the 
memory literature in suggesting that age differences increase with the degree of self-initiated 
processing during memory retrieval (Lindenberger & Mayr, 2014). Modeling of the strategies 
underlying decisions suggests that younger adults balance the high demand on memory by 
switching to a simpler non-compensatory strategy. Older adults do not seem to compensate but 
instead select idiosyncratic strategies more often. The latter do not fit the traditional framework 
of compensatory versus non-compensatory processing. Overall, the results may have important 
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implications for the boundary conditions of age-related compensation mechanisms and adaptive 
strategy selection (i.e. the selection of simpler decision strategies to offset high cognitive 
demand). They also highlight the role of decision aids that may especially help older adults to 
make adequate decisions in cognitively challenging decision environments. 
 
 
Interim Summary  
This work makes important contributions to the emerging field of cognitive aging and 
decision making competence. It is consistent with predictions from the SOC theory on successful 
aging as well as an ecological rational perspective on aging and decision making: Age-
differences in decision making were a function of task demand and the available cognitive 
resources of the age groups. In particular, individual memory ability seems to be a crucial factor 
for adequate decision making, especially in older ages. The means by which especially older 
adults solve the decision problem, their strategy selection, remains unclear. In what follows, I 
will give an outlook for important questions for future research studying the interaction between 
memory and decision making in developmental populations. 
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What Remains Open – Important Questions for Future Research 
 
Further Insights Into Strategic Memory and Decision Making Processes 
This work shows that the impact of changes in cognitive abilities on decision making 
strongly depends on the demands of the specific choice environment, here memory demands. The 
accuracy of decisions made by individuals of all ages is the result of how such demands interact 
with the selection of particular strategies. Yet, this work does not provide definite conclusions 
about the relevant memory components or processes underlying these deficits and the selection of 
strategies. There are several important aspects worth an investigation in future research.  
The Relative Contribution of Associative and Working Memory 
Previous work in the memory literature provides evidence for robust age-related deficits 
in retrieval of associative memories as well as the ability to strategically manipulate and integrate 
information successfully in working memory (Shing et al., 2008). The decision task in the studies 
described above relies on both memory components and therefore does not allow differentiating 
their relative contribution to the observed deficits. Is it that older adults rely more on false 
memories and, as a result, make more erroneous decisions or, alternatively, is it that they fail 
during the process of integration in working memory? 
Studying age-related changes in the ability to execute decision strategies correctly and 
successfully may help to approach this issue. The rationale is that decision strategies proposed in 
the decision making literature can vary in their degree of cognitive demand (e.g. Beach & 
Mitchell, 1978). Compensatory decision strategies, like tallying for example, use all available 
information. Simpler decision strategies use only a subset of all possible information and are 
therefore less cognitively demanding. Existent literature reports that especially older adults have 
difficulties in using compensatory decision strategies relative to young adults (Mata, von 
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Helversen, & Rieskamp, 2010; Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007). By forcing participants to use 
specific strategies, future research can control the cognitive processes and provide evidence for 
predictors of age-differences in performance as a function of the cognitive complexity of these 
processes in different choice environments. That is, further experimental manipulations can 
replace the demand of online retrieval by information search on the screen (e.g. via mouse lab or 
eye-tracking; Renkewitz & Jahn, 2012; Scholz, von Helversen, & Rieskamp, 2015) and test the 
effects of information integration versus recall deficiencies for a particular strategy. 
When Easy Comes Hard in Memory 
Executing a compensatory decision strategy becomes more challenging the more 
information has to be recalled from memory. In line with the cost-benefit idea of strategy 
selection, individuals shift to non-compensatory strategies like take-the-best when cognitive 
capacities are limited (Bröder & Schiffer, 2006) or when the costs of information search are high 
such as in memory-based decisions (Bröder & Schiffer, 2003). Yet, previous research uncovered 
a potential drawback of the simple decision strategy take-the-best (Khader, Pachur, Meier, Bien, 
Jost, & Rösler, 2011). In particular, on the neuronal level, this supposedly simple strategy has 
shown to require selective control of posterior information storage areas necessary for successful 
recall and integration orchestrated by the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC). This cognitive 
control process may especially be challenging for older adults. It follows that future work is 
necessary to understand whether older adults necessarily benefit from the reduced information 
load of simpler non-compensatory decision strategies. Neuroimaging studies that compare the 
neuronal correlates of such strategies can help to shed light on this issue and age differences 
thereof. 
Individualized Cost-Benefit Tradeoffs in Information Search 
Contingency approaches to decision making propose that individuals select decision 
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strategies that are adapted to the demands of the task and their cognitive capacities (Mata et al., 
2012). Past research found that older adults engage in less information search prior to a decision 
(Mata & Nunes, 2010) and that individuals may trade-off the utility of more information versus 
the costs of retrieval when making decisions. Our modeling results show that especially older 
adults resort to strategies that, albeit still methodical, are more idiosyncratic, and do not fit the 
traditional framework of compensatory versus non-compensatory processing. One assumption 
could be that the individual cost-benefit tradeoffs for information search become highly 
individualized. That said, older adults may still integrate across some but not all cues and this 
number may differ by individual. Verbal protocols may be helpful for evaluating these individual 
benchmarks (Cokely & Kelley, 2009). 
 
Potential for Targeted Decision Aids In Complex Decision Situations 
We show that memory demand is one extreme condition that leads to pronounced decision 
making deficits between young and older adults. When information needs to be retrieved from 
memory especially older adults may fail during recall and/or integration of this information. 
However, we show that when information is conveniently presented on a screen, age differences 
in decision making are relatively small. These insights provide important opportunities for the 
development of interventions and decision aids, external memory cues, or interactive designs that 
support decision making. For example, such aids may increase salience of cues relevant for 
choice quality but keep low the demands for information recall and integration. Further work is 
necessary to better understand the circumstances under which the provision of such aids, or 
retrieval cues, can support decision making and provide guidance for a more structured decision 
making process. 
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Summary and Conclusion 
The Selective Optimization with Compensation approach emphasizes the need to adapt 
behavior in response to changes in own resources over the life span. According to an ecological 
rational perspective in decision making, individuals adapt their behavior to the affordances of 
their choice environment. The work presented in this dissertation is in line with both 
perspectives. It shows that developmental phenomena such as changes in decision making can be 
understood as (efforts to) adaptive performances of individuals in response to changes in their 
own resources (e.g. cognitive capacity) as well as in the environment surrounding them. First, 
although showing descriptive characteristics of a personality trait, risk-taking propensities varied 
substantially by life domain. Individual differences in the perceptions of costs and benefits 
showed to be associated with such age- and domain-differences. Second, the relation between age 
and risk-taking propensity is related to the level of hardship in different countries with high levels 
leading to flatter age-risk curves. Third, age-differences in decision performance are a function of 
the demands imposed by a task. Memory abilities show to represent an important boundary 
condition adaptive performance in choice tasks. Overall, these findings emphasize that in order to 
predict life span changes in decision making, one needs to take the interaction between cognition, 
behavior, and environment into account. 
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ality research has distinguished between different types of change,
with conceptually and empirically distinct implications (Briley &
Tucker-Drob, 2014; Roberts & DelVecchio, 2000). For example,
differential stability, or rank-order stability, a defining feature of a
trait, can be independent from mean-level or normative age-related
changes in the same trait.
Past work on adult age differences in risk taking has focused on
mean-level changes estimated from cross-sectional comparisons,
thus precluding a direct investigation of other conceptualizations
of stability/change (e.g., rank-order stability). In our work, we
explore different conceptualizations of stability and change in
risk-taking propensity across the adult life span by drawing on a
unique data set from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study
(SOEP) (Wagner, Frick, & Schupp, 2007). This multicohort study
combines longitudinal self-report data on both general and
domain-specific risk-taking propensity with cross-sectional behav-
ioral measurements of risk taking. Specifically, we investigate (a)
differential stability, (b) mean-level differences, and (c)
individual-level differences in change in both general and domain-
specific self-report measures of risk-taking propensity, and relate
(d) mean-level changes in self-report to mean-level changes in
behavioral measures of social and nonsocial risk taking. Our goal
is to advance the understanding of risk taking by evaluating the
role of both domain (e.g., financial, social) and measure (self-
report vs. behavior) on the stability of risk-taking propensity across
adulthood.
In what follows, we first provide an overview of some of the
constructs of change that have been investigated in the personality
literature. Second, we review previous work on risk-taking pro-
pensity against the background of different conceptualizations of
change. Third, we describe the present study and the main research
questions addressed.
Characterizing Life Span Changes in Personality
There are several conceptually and empirically distinct ap-
proaches to personality stability/change. We highlight three main
types: differential stability, mean-level stability, and individual-
level stability (Briley & Tucker-Drob, 2014; Roberts & DelVec-
chio, 2000). First, differential stability refers to consistency in the
rank ordering of individuals over time. The idea that individuals
differ systematically from one another and that those differences
are maintained over time echoes the concept of a trait. A number
of meta-analyses have found that key personality traits, the Big
Five personality traits, show considerable rank-order stability (Bri-
ley & Tucker-Drob, 2014; Ferguson, 2010; Roberts & DelVecchio,
2000). However, differential stability of personality traits under-
goes systematic changes across the life span, with correlations
ranging from 0 in infancy to .7 in adulthood (Briley & Tucker-
Drob, 2014). There is still debate concerning whether there is some
decrease in stability at the end of the life span. Meta-analytic
results show only a trend toward decreasing stability in old age
(Briley & Tucker-Drob, 2014); but a few studies with large num-
bers of older individuals have found clear inverted U-shaped
patterns in differential stability for all Big Five personality traits
(Lucas & Donnellan, 2011; Specht, Egloff, & Schmukle, 2011;
Wortman, Lucas, & Donnellan, 2012). From a developmental
perspective, it seems reasonable to expect an inverted U-shaped
pattern, because periods marked by significant biological, cogni-
tive, or social changes—that is, young adulthood and old age—
could lead to marked changes in phenotypes, including personality
traits such as risk-taking propensity, and their adaptation to these
changes at different phases of the life span.
Second, mean-level stability refers to consistency in the average
level of traits over time, and thus reflects normative/general pat-
terns that apply to large numbers of individuals. Importantly,
personality traits with high differential (rank-order) stability show
systematic mean-level changes across the life span. For example,
a number of studies coincide in their finding that average levels of
agreeableness and conscientiousness show increasing mean-level
trends across the life span, whereas neuroticism and openness to
experience, in contrast, show reliable mean-level decreases with
age (Lucas & Donnellan, 2009, 2011; Roberts, Walton, & Viech-
tbauer, 2006; Specht et al., 2011). The mean-level developmental
trends observed for personality traits are typically thought to be
adaptive in the sense of improving individuals’ capabilities to
fulfill adult roles such as increased relationship stability and qual-
ity, or success at work, among others (i.e., the maturity principle of
personality development; Caspi, Roberts, & Shiner, 2005). There
is considerable debate, however, about the role of biological
(Costa & McCrae, 2006) and social factors (Roberts, Wood, &
Smith, 2005) in engendering mean-level personality change.
Third, individual-level stability refers to the consistency of a
trait at the level of the individual person. One typical way of
detecting this kind of stability is to test for individual differences
in change in a growth-modeling context: Significant variance in
slopes confirms the presence of exceptions to the normative
(mean-level) trend for the sample. Note that, on the whole, a lack
of mean-level change does not preclude individual-level variation
or individual differences in change across time: A trait may in-
crease across the life span in some individuals, but decrease in
others, resulting in no overall mean-change at the group level
despite significant individual-level changes (i.e., variance in
slopes). One issue related to individual-level change is whether
individual differences can be accounted for by other endogenous
or exogenous variables, that is, specific predictors that may be
associated with individual differences in change. For example,
Chopik, Kim, and Smith (2015) show that within-person changes
in optimism across the life span are systematically related to
within-person changes in self-reported levels of health, consistent
(albeit not conclusively) with the hypothesis that individual dif-
ferences in the former are caused by the latter. The investigation of
individual changes and their predictors (e.g., cognitive ability,
health, life events) can thus be important for gaining greater insight
into the individual dynamics of personality development across the
life span.
The Concept of Risk-Taking Propensity and Potential
Changes Across the Life Span
The literature offers various definitions of risk and risk taking
(Aven, 2012; Schonberg et al., 2011). One characterization of
risk-taking propensity is the tendency to engage in behavior that
bears the chance of losses (e.g., financial losses, physical harm) as
well as gains (e.g., financial gains, excitement). Disciplines such as
economics and psychology have developed different measures of
such tendencies (Appelt, Milch, Handgraaf, & Weber, 2011). In
economics, for example, individual risk-taking propensity is often
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estimated from choices between monetary lotteries with varying
probabilities of gains and/or losses (Holt & Laury, 2002; Markow-
itz, 1952). Other measures integrate the social context, with indi-
vidual outcomes and their probabilities depending on another
person (Ben-Ner & Halldorsson, 2010; Berg, Dickhaut, & Mc-
Cabe, 1995; Fehr, Fischbacher, Schupp, Rosenbladt, & Wagner,
2002; Houser, Schunk, & Winter, 2010; Lönnqvist, Verkasalo,
Walkowitz, & Wichardt, 2011; Nickel & Vaesen, 2012). In psy-
chology, there have been two common approaches to measuring
risk-taking propensity: The first employs behavioral measures of
risk taking, including the monetary lotteries described above, but
also tasks that try to capture learning and experience (e.g., Hertwig
& Erev, 2009), such as n-armed bandit tasks (Bechara, Damasio,
Damasio, & Anderson, 1994) or other sequential decision tasks
(Lejuez et al., 2002). The second approach employs self-report
measures to elicit individual risk preferences in hypothetical sce-
narios or real-world behavior (Nicholson, Soane, Fenton-
O’Creevy, & Willman, 2005; Weber et al., 2002; Wortman et al.,
2012).
There is ongoing debate about how these different behavioral
and self-report measures relate to each other as well as to real-
world behavior. Past work suggests that the behavioral and self-
report measures are only weakly correlated, and that correlations to
real-world behavior are, at best, small (Anderson & Mellor, 2009;
Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 2005; Dohmen et al., 2011; Friedman
et al., 2014; Schoemaker, 1990). One potential contributor to the
poor correlation between measures is the extent to which risk-
taking propensity is specific to particular domains (Weber et al.,
2002). Some empirical investigations of self-report measures sug-
gest that it is possible to separate distinct factors of risk taking (i.e.,
social, financial, health) and that these factors can characterize
risk-taking propensities of distinct groups of individuals (Hanoch
& Gummerum, 2011). Hanoch, Johnson, and Wilke (2006), for
example, demonstrated that targeted subgroups of individuals
(e.g., investors or smokers) scored highest in risk-taking propen-
sity in the respective risk domain (e.g., financial or health) relative
to other life domains. Partly because of the lack of systematic
quantitative reviews estimating the links between different risk
measures and domains, it remains unclear whether domain speci-
ficity can fully account for the small correlations observed among
risk-taking measures and real-world outcomes.
In this study, we examine whether life span changes unfold in
similar ways across different domains and measures of risk taking,
thus providing further insights into the anatomy of risk taking. In
the following, we briefly review past research based on the three
conceptualizations of change outlined above. We focus on research
on adulthood and aging rather than early and adolescent develop-
ment, which has received considerable attention elsewhere
(Braams, van Duijvenvoorde, Peper, & Crone, 2015; Defoe, Du-
bas, Figner, & van Aken, 2015; Figner, Mackinlay, Wilkening, &
Weber, 2009; Harden, Quinn, & Tucker-Drob, 2012; Shulman,
Harden, Chein, & Steinberg, 2015; Steinberg, 2008).
Rank-Order Stability in Risk-Taking Propensity
As mentioned above, there is evidence for an inverted U-shaped
link between age and rank-order stability in many personality
traits. This pattern could represent the effects of biological, cog-
nitive, or social changes that occur at both ends of the life span
(Lucas & Donnellan, 2011; Specht et al., 2011). Does this pattern
extend to risk-taking propensity? Does it generalize across do-
mains? Findings of domain-specificity in rank-order stability func-
tions could provide insights into different causes in the develop-
ment of risk taking in different domains of life.
Data on the rank-order stability of risk taking propensity are
scarce and little to nothing is known about changes across the life
span. Only very few studies have examined behavioral measures of
risk across longer time spans (see Chuang & Schechter, 2015, for
an overview). Even at short time spans, however, the rank-order
stability of behavioral measures seems to vary considerably across
measures and studies. Some studies have found evidence for
moderate rank-order stability of behavioral measures over short
periods of time of days or weeks (Harrison, Johnson, McInnes, &
Rutström, 2005; Lejuez et al., 2002), whereas other studies have
reported poor rank-order stability across short delays and between
different risk measures collected at the same measurement occa-
sion (Anderson & Mellor, 2009; Berg et al., 2005; Dave, Eckel,
Johnson, & Rojas, 2010; Friedman et al., 2014; Reynaud & Cou-
ture, 2012; Schoemaker, 1990; Szrek, Chao, Ramlagen, & Peltzer,
2012). The few published studies using longer delays suggest low
to moderate rank-order stability (Anokhin, Golosheykin, Grant, &
Heath, 2009; Chuang & Schechter, 2015; Lönnqvist et al., 2011).
More studies have used self-report data to assess risk taking or
related constructs, such as sensation seeking and impulsivity that
show moderate levels of stability over time (Collado, Felton,
MacPherson, & Lejuez, 2014; Niv, Tuvblad, Raine, Wang, &
Baker, 2012; Roth, Schumacher, & Brähler, 2005; Zuckerman &
Kuhlman, 2000). For self-reported risk-taking propensity mea-
sures, studies suggest high rank-order stability across short inter-
vals (Blais & Weber, 2006) and medium to high levels of rank-
order stability across longer periods of years (Sahm, 2012).
However, most studies have typically focused on adolescents (Niv
et al., 2012), have not included large numbers of older adults, or
failed to provide analyses of developmental issues (Benjamin et
al., 2012; Chuang & Schechter, 2015; Jung & Treibich, 2014;
Mandal & Roe, 2014). Consequently, little is known about patterns
of rank-order stability in risk taking across the adult life span, and
nothing about the domain-specificity of such patterns.
Mean-Level Differences in Risk-Taking Propensity
Biological theories view the propensity for risk taking as a
behavioral strategy or functional adaptation to maximize reproduc-
tive success (Campbell, 1999; Mishra, 2014; Sih & Del Giudice,
2012). Risk taking thus serves an adaptive function that may vary
across the life span. According to behavioral ecology, in young
adulthood, risk behaviors may be instrumental in gaining access to
potential mating partners via resource control and status. Conse-
quently, risky and competitive behaviors can be expected to be
more prevalent among young males than among females and older
individuals (Daly & Wilson, 1997; Mishra, 2014). Later in the life
cycle, individuals are expected to place higher value on objectives
such as guarding their own lives because their offspring’s survival
depends on parental and, in particular, maternal care and defense
(Campbell, 1999). Behavioral ecology would further predict that
patterns of life span changes in risk taking vary as a function of
domain to the extent that different domains are more or less
instrumental to survival and reproductive success across adult-
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3STABILITY AND CHANGE IN RISK-TAKING PROPENSITY
hood. To our knowledge, however, there has been no explicit
theorizing about domain-specific differences in the life span tra-
jectory of risk taking.
The bulk of empirical research on risk taking across adulthood
has investigated mean-level changes. Findings based on behavioral
measures of risk taking have been mixed, with some measures
indicating a reduction in risk taking with age and others showing
no differences or even increases. Most notably, recent meta-
analyses report more pronounced age differences in behavioral risk
tasks that require learning of the relationship between outcomes
and probabilities such as in the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) or the
Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART) relative to standard gamble
paradigms (Best & Charness, 2015; Mata et al., 2011). This
heterogeneity as a function of measures also mirrors results from
research summarized in a meta-analysis on adolescent risk taking
(Defoe et al., 2015). Against this background, there is considerable
interest in task characteristics (e.g., memory and learning de-
mands) that may engender specific patterns of age differences in
behavioral measures of risk taking (Frey, Mata, & Hertwig, 2015).
Another avenue has been to investigate self-reported risk taking,
for which results seem more consistent, showing a decrease in
risk-taking propensity across adulthood (Bonem, Ellsworth, &
Gonzalez, 2015; Mata, Josef, & Hertwig, in press; Roalf, Mitchell,
Harbaugh, & Janowsky, 2012; Rolison, Hanoch, Wood, & Liu,
2014; Rosman, Garcia, Lee, Butler, & Schwartz, 2013; Schwartz et
al., 2013). Importantly, investigations of age differences in self-
reported risk-taking propensity in different domains suggest that
the overall reduction in risk-taking propensity plays out somewhat
differently as a function of domain (e.g., financial, health, social).
That is, financial and recreational risk-taking propensity showed
steeper declines relative to risk-taking propensity in the social,
ethical and health domains (Rolison et al., 2014).
It is important to note that this work on mean-level changes in
risk taking has been conducted using cross-sectional designs. To
our knowledge, there has been no assessment of longitudinal
change in self-reported risk-taking propensity as a function of
domain. Consequently, it remains unclear whether the cross-
sectional findings generalize to longitudinal change in risk-taking
propensity. Finally, the link between self-report and behavioral
patterns of risk taking across adulthood remains to be studied.
Some studies have investigated this link in young populations and
provide evidence for only small correlations between the two types
of risk measures (Mishra, Lalumière, & Williams, 2010; Szrek et
al., 2012). It remains unclear whether self-report and behavioral
measures capture similar mean-level changes in risk taking across
the life span, and do so similarly across domains.
Individual-Level Differences in
Risk-Taking Propensity
A number of hypotheses have been formulated on the link
between individual differences in risk taking and other individual
characteristics. Classic economic theories suggest that situational
characteristics, such as fluctuations in individual’s wealth (Ber-
noulli, 1954; Brunnermeier & Nagel, 2008; Chiappori & Paiella,
2011), play an important role in individual differences on risk
taking. More recently, there has been an attempt to ground theories
of individual differences in economic behavior in personality
theory (Borghans, Duckworth, Heckman, & Weel, 2008). In line
with these efforts, various studies have investigated the relation
between risk taking and the Big Five personality factors. Although
the results are mixed, there is some evidence that individual
differences in personality may be related to risk-taking behavior:
Risk taking has been found to be positively associated with Open-
ness to Experience, Extraversion, and Sensation Seeking; and
negatively associated with Agreeableness and Neuroticism
(Becker, Deckers, Dohmen, Falk, & Kosse, 2012; Deck, Lee,
Reyes, & Rosen, 2012; Mishra & Lalumière, 2011; Nicholson et
al., 2005; Prinz, Gründer, Hilgers, Holtemöller, & Vernaleken,
2014). There are also some findings linking personality variables
to performance on behavioral measures of risk taking, such as the
Iowa Gambling or the Balloon Analogue Risk Task. Yet, the
pattern of results is also mixed, partly due to the use of different
personality and temperament measures as well as behavioral tasks
(Hooper, Luciana, Wahlstrom, Conklin, & Yarger, 2008; Lauriola,
Panno, Levin, & Lejuez, 2014; Suhr & Tsanadis, 2007). To our
knowledge, however, there have been no attempts to directly link
change in situational and personality variables to individual-level
change in risk-taking propensity or to examine whether such
effects vary across domains. Identifying parallels between the
development of major personality traits and risk-taking propensity
is an important step in relating these constructs.
The Present Study
Using an extensive longitudinal data set representative of the
population living in Germany, we aim to assess stability in risk-
taking propensity across adulthood, and the domain-generality (or
specificity) thereof. To this end, we examine the following re-
search questions: Are there systematic life span differences in (a)
differential and (b) mean-level stability of both general and
domain-specific self-report measures of risk-taking propensity?
Are there (c) intraindividual differences in change in risk-taking
propensity and what are their predictors? Also, (d) do any mean-
level changes in self-reported risk-taking propensity correspond to
those observed in behavioral measures of social and nonsocial risk
taking? We thus examine the nature of risk taking by evaluating
the role of both domain (e.g., financial, social) and measure
(self-report vs. behavior) on stability of risk-taking propensity
across adulthood.
We used longitudinal data from the German Socio-Economic
Panel Study (SOEP; Wagner et al., 2007) to examine life span
trajectories in self-reported domain-general and domain-specific
risk-taking propensity. To our knowledge, this is the longest-term
and most complete multicohort dataset available to model risk-
taking trajectories across the life span using within-person data.
First, from 2004 on, and for up to nine years, more than 44,000
SOEP respondents answered a question on their domain-general
risk-taking propensity (Dohmen et al., 2011). Second, a subsample
of more than 11,000 respondents answered six additional questions
concerning their propensity to take risks in the driving, financial,
recreational, occupational, health, and social domain in up to three
waves at 5-year intervals (specifically, in 2004, 2009, and 2014).
These data from a large number of individuals of different ages,
followed up over time, allow us to discern between mean-level
population trends, as investigated in cross-sectional studies, and
individual differences in change in risk-taking propensity over
time. Third, we were able to connect these rich data on risk-taking
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4 JOSEF ET AL.
to individual personality measurements (i.e., the Big Five; Open-
ness to Experience, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeable-
ness, and Neuroticism) assessed in 2005, 2009, and 2013 (Lang,
John, Lüdtke, Schupp, & Wagner, 2011) and other potentially
relevant variables (e.g., current income) to investigate sources of
individual differences in change in risk-taking in different domains
across adulthood. Fourth, and finally, we compared results based
on self-report measures with results from behavioral experiments,
using data from two subsamples of SOEP respondents who par-
ticipated in two behavioral tests thought to measure social and
nonsocial forms of risk-taking behavior, respectively: a trust game
assessed in 2004 (N ! 646) and a monetary lottery assessed in
2005 (N! 433; Fehr et al., 2002; Holt & Laury, 2002; see Method
for details).
Method
German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), 1984–2014
The German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP, www.leibniz-soep
.de) is a large longitudinal multicohort survey collected in house-
holds in Germany that has compiled data by means of face-to-face
and computer-assisted personalized interviews (CAPI) since 1984
(Wagner et al., 2007). Private households are sampled to be
representative of the population living in Germany in terms of
several demographic and occupational characteristics and geo-
graphical region. Moreover, active efforts are made to maintain the
representativeness of the sample by interviewing split-offs from
the original households. For example, when a young person leaves
the parental household, his or her new household becomes part of
the study. The SOEP thus provides information about a large
number of individuals over several time points and can be used to
investigate the dynamics of important economic, social, and psy-
chological variables across the life span. Approximately 20,000
individuals (11,000 households) were interviewed in each wave
between 2004 and 2014. This includes both attrition and the
inclusion of new respondents from refresher samples, which have
been added to the original sample in each wave since 1984.
Informed consent was obtained from all respondents before data
collection in all waves. Because the SOEP assesses data from
individuals in the same household, it is likely that data are more
similar within households. We control for this nonindependence by
clustering the survey data on the household level in our analyses.
Measures
Self-reported risk-taking propensity. A question on general
risk-taking propensity was included in nine waves of the survey
spanning 10 years (2004, 2006, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012,
2013, and 2014). It was worded as follows: “Are you generally a
person who is willing to take risks or do you try to avoid taking
risks? Please tick a box on the scale, where the value 0 means not
at all willing to take risks and the value 10 means very willing to
take risks.” Six questions on risk-taking propensity in specific
domains (driving, financial, recreational, occupational, health, and
social) were included in three waves (2004, 2009, and 2014). The
wording was as follows: “People can behave differently in differ-
ent situations. How would you rate your willingness to take risks
in the following areas? Please tick a box in each line of the scale!”
All seven items were rated on a 0–10 Likert-type scale from not
at all willing to take risks to very willing to take risks (see
Supplemental Materials for original items used). The items are part
of the risk aversion scale that was first piloted in a pretest within
a subset of the SOEP population in 2003 (Dohmen et al., 2011).
Since their first administration in the main questionnaire in 2004,
the items—particularly the general risk-taking propensity item—
have been used in other scientific analyses on risk taking (e.g.,
Benjamin et al., 2012; Bonin, Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, & Sunde,
2007; Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, & Sunde, 2010; Lönnqvist et al.,
2011; Szrek et al., 2012), where they have shown good internal
consistency (" ! .85) and, to some extent, correlations with
self-reported real-world risk behavior (Dohmen et al., 2011). Anal-
yses on the dimensionality of risk-taking propensity suggest that a
single-factor model captures the ratings reasonably well (see Sup-
plemental Materials). Nevertheless, in our analyses, we opted to
analyze each item separately to delineate domain-specific patterns
of change and stability across adulthood.
For general risk-taking propensity, the longitudinal sample an-
alyzed here consists of 44,076 individuals between 18 and 85 years
of age (M! 44.1, SD! 14.0; 52% female), who were interviewed
on their self-reported general risk propensity in up to nine waves
of assessment between 2004 and 2014. For the six domain-specific
risk propensity items, the longitudinal sample consists of N !
11,903 individuals with the same age range (M! 44.1, SD! 14.0;
51% female) who answered domain-specific items in at least two
of the three waves of assessment (domain-specific risk-taking
propensity was assessed in 2004, 2009, and 2014).
Behavioral measures: Social and nonsocial risk taking. In
addition, we analyzed behavioral data from subsamples of SOEP
respondents between 18 and 85 years of age who participated in
experiments assessing social (646 individuals, M ! 50.0, SD !
16.8; 51% female) and nonsocial behavioral measures of risk
taking (433 individuals, M ! 48.8, SD ! 17.5; 52% female).
Nonsocial risk taking. In 2005, a subset of randomly selected
(random route sampling method) respondents from the SOEP
population played a lottery game presented in their homes on a
survey computer as part of a pretest for the SOEP interview.
Respondents were asked to make up to 20 choices between a risky
lottery (win €300 or €0 with 50% probability, expected value
€150) and a safe amount of money (Holt & Laury, 2002). The
lottery stayed constant in all trials and the safe amount offered
increased after each trial in which the lottery was chosen (€0–€190
in €10 increments). Individual risk preferences can thus be deter-
mined by identifying the trial in which a respondent switches from
preferring the lottery to the safe amount (thus narrowing down the
person’s certainty equivalent). Respondents who prefer a safe
amount of money that is smaller than the expected value of the
lottery is typically considered to be risk averse; respondents who
choose the lottery even when the safety equivalent exceeds the
expected value of the risk option (€150) are considered to be risk
seeking.
Respondents’ choices were incentivized. Specifically, they were
instructed that one in every seven participants would be randomly
picked and win a monetary payment. The computer determined the
value of the payment (which varied between €0 and €300) by
randomly choosing one of the outcomes of the participant’s 20
decisions. All winners were paid by check after the experiment
was completed.
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5STABILITY AND CHANGE IN RISK-TAKING PROPENSITY
Social risk taking. In 2004, a subset of respondents selected
randomly from the SOEP population (sample F) participated in a
trust game as part of the annual SOEP interview. Each respondent
was assigned to one of two groups (Group 1 ! Player 1; Group
2 ! Player 2), endowed with 10 points, and instructed that he or
she would participate in a “give and take” game that he or she
would play with another anonymous respondent from the SOEP
population. In total, N ! 1,295 respondents participated in this
experiment. N ! 646 respondents were randomly assigned to
Group 1, and n ! 649 individuals to Group 2.
To play the game, both players decided how much of their
endowment to transfer to their opponent (0–10 points). First,
Player 1 decided how many points to transfer to Player 2 (measure
of trust) and wrote a number between 0 and 10 on a sheet of paper.
Each point transferred was then doubled as an income for Player 2.
In response to this received income, Player 2 decided how many
points of his or her endowment to back-transfer (measure of
fairness) and wrote a number between 0 and 10 on a sheet of paper.
This amount was then doubled as an income for Player 1. Both
players received instructions about the incentive structure of the
game before making their transactions: Each point they kept in-
creased their own income by €1; each point they transferred
increased the other’s income by €2. Because the game was con-
ducted as part of the SOEP interview at respondents’ homes, no
real-time interaction was possible. Endowments that Player 2
received from Player 1 were therefore automatically sampled from
a simulation of Players in a pretest. All respondents were paid by
check after the experiment. We used the number of points trans-
ferred by Player 1 (Group 1, n ! 646) as a measure of trust and
social risk taking (Fehr et al., 2002; Lönnqvist et al., 2011).
The Big Five. In 2005, 2009, and 2013 the SOEP used a short
version of the Big Five personality inventory (BFI-S) to measure
Openness to Experience, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agree-
ableness, and Neuroticism (Gerlitz & Schupp, 2005; John, Dona-
hue, & Kentle, 1991; Lang et al., 2011). The BFI is a 15-item
self-report questionnaire (three items per dimension) requiring a 1
(does not apply at all) to 7 (applies perfectly) rating. The shortened
version of the BFI (used due to time limitations) has shown
reasonably high correlations with the original version of the ques-
tionnaire (Donnellan & Lucas, 2008). It has also been used in
scientific work on the life span development of personality traits
(Donnellan & Lucas, 2008; Lucas & Donnellan, 2011; Specht et
al., 2011). The scale was developed and validated within a pretest-
sample of the SOEP population (see Lang et al., 2011, for infor-
mation on internal consistency and test–retest reliability). To in-
vestigate correlated change between the Big Five personality traits
and risk-taking propensity, we analyzed data from N ! 11,903
respondents who answered both items on risk-taking propensity
and completed the personality inventory.
Ethics Statement
The German Institute for Economic Research (DIW), Berlin,
contracted TNS Infratest Sozialforschung GmbH and TNS Infrat-
est GmbH & Cp. KG in Munich to carry out the SOEP survey
“Leben in Deutschland (Living in Germany).” Data collection,
processing, and storage were in full accordance with German data
protection regulations. Research was overseen by the DIW scien-
tific advisory board. The ethics committee of the Max Planck
Institute for Human Development additionally approved the au-
thors’ use of the data for research purposes in accordance with
German data protection regulations. German data privacy laws
necessitate that all users sign a data user contract with the DIW
Berlin. The survey data files are provided in anonymous form
only. The institutes listed above do not provide third parties with
any data that would permit individuals to be identified. The same
applies to the follow-up surveys. Individual data from separate
interviews are linked by a code number.
Analytic Approach
As outlined before, our analyses addressed the following re-
search questions: Are there systematic life span differences in (a)
differential and (b) mean-level stability of both general and
domain-specific risk-taking propensity? Are there (c) intraindi-
vidual differences in changes and what are their predictors? Also,
(d) do any mean-level changes in self-reported risk-taking propen-
sity correspond to those observed in behavioral measures of social
and nonsocial risk taking?
Differential stability of risk-taking propensity. To address
question (a), we first calculated rank-order stability coefficients
between each of the waves in which domain-general and domain-
specific risk propensity was assessed. Specifically, we calculated
test–retest correlations (r) across three waves (2004, 2009, and
2014) of assessment. These correlations reflect the degree to which
the relative ordering of individuals within the sample was main-
tained over time.
Second, to investigate the effect of age on rank-order stability,
we divided the domain-specific sample into 10 five-year age
cohorts and calculated rank-order stability in these cohorts for the
two 5-year periods (2004–2009; 2009–2014) and the 10-year
period (2004–2014). Because the number of old individuals in the
sample was limited, the oldest age group comprised individuals
aged from 73 to 85 years. To quantify the effect of age, we fitted
a locally smoothed regression line as well as a regression line fitted
to all test–retest correlations from the different cohorts by predict-
ing differential stability from age and age squared across the 10
cohorts. To control for the fact that the test–retest correlations stem
from different time intervals, we included a cluster variable within
a mixed-effects regression model framework.
Mean-level changes in risk-taking propensity. To answer
question (b), we used latent growth curve models (McArdle &
Nesselroade, 2003) to estimate change in domain-general and
domain-specific risk-taking propensity across the life span. Spe-
cifically, we employed a separate latent growth curve model for
each domain. Each domain was measured by one item at each
measurement point. Each model included a latent intercept factor
(i) and a latent slope factor (s). The latent intercept factor was fixed
to 1 at each measurement point and reflected individual differences
at the first point of measurement (2004). The latent slope factor (s)
was fixed to 0 for the first measurement point and reflected the
amount of mean-level linear change per time unit increase.
Weights for the other measurement points were selected such that
they reflected the estimated mean difference between two neigh-
boring measurement points. Means and variances were estimated
for both the slope and the intercept. Mean values of (i) represent
the average risk-taking propensity at the population level. The
variance in (i) shows whether individuals already differed at the
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6 JOSEF ET AL.
first wave of assessment. Mean values of (s) represent the average
rate of change. The variance in (s) shows whether individuals
differed in their rates of change (see Figure 1A and 1B for a model
representation of domain-general and domain-specific risk propen-
sity).
We were particularly interested in estimating the effects of age.
In addition, because theoretical predictions (Mishra, 2014) and
empirical results (Byrnes, Miller, & Schafer, 1999) suggest sex
differences in risk taking, we also estimated the effects of sex. To
this end, we included sex (female ! 1, male ! 0) and age, age2,
age3, as covariates and estimated linear, quadratic, and cubic
effects of age on intercept and slope parameters. To test effects of
age, sex, and their interactions on mean risk-taking propensity (i)
and change thereof (s), we adopted a stepwise approach: Higher
order terms of age and interactions of age and sex were included
only if they were significant at p " .05 and increased model fit.
We applied this method to intercept and slope separately. Age was
mean-centered before higher order terms were calculated. Age and
sex were included as linear predictors if their effect on intercept or
slope was not significant in order to nevertheless show and discuss
their effect for these particular risk domains. Model fit evaluation
was based on full information maximum-likelihood estimates that
allow for missing data across measurement points (Schafer &
Graham, 2002). Because traditional chi-square model test statistics
are influenced by sample size, we relied on additional measures of
fit, such as comparative fit index (Bentler, 1990), root-mean-
square error of approximation (Steiger, 1990), and standardized
root-mean-square residual (Bentler, 1990) with cut-off values of
CFI# .95, RMSEA" .06, and SRMR" .08 for reasonable model
fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999).
Individual-level changes in risk-taking propensity. To an-
swer question (c), we tested whether the latent growth curve
models showed significant variation in levels of change on the
individual level (significant estimates of slope variances). In ad-
dition, we investigated whether within-person changes in risk-
taking propensity were associated with within-person changes in
the variables of interest (i.e., the Big Five personality traits and
income). Specifically, we estimated bivariate latent growth curve
models in which a latent growth curve of each personality trait
(Openness to Experience, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agree-
ableness, and Neuroticism) was linked to a latent growth curve of
risk-taking propensity (general, driving, financial, recreational,
occupational, health, and social) by correlating the respective
intercepts and slopes (see Figure 2 for model representation).
Correlations between intercept estimates can be interpreted in the
same way as correlations from cross-sectional data, whereas cor-
relations among slopes represent how two variables change to-
gether over development. The key parameter of interest in this
parallel process model was thus the correlation between the slope
factors of risk taking and personality/income. For example, posi-
tive correlated change would indicate that those respondents who
show changes in risk-taking propensity show concordant changes
in the respective personality trait. Because the rate of change is
often correlated with initial status, we also included correlations
between intercepts. To control for cross-sectional age differences,
age (centered) was included as a covariate. We estimated models
for each domain of risk taking with each personality trait sepa-
rately. A similar model was used to investigate correlated changes
with income. In these models, change in income at each measure-
ment point was correlated with within-person change in risk-taking
propensity.
Mean-level trajectory of behavioral measures of risk taking.
To answer question (d), we used regression models of the cross-
sectional data from the experiments conducted in 2004 and 2005 to
estimate age-related mean-level change in social and nonsocial
risk taking. Age was centered to the sample means. Again, higher
order terms of age were included only if they were significant at
p " .05, and linear effects of age were reported if the effect of the
higher order terms was not significant. We computed Pearson
product–moment correlations between behavioral and self-report
measures of risk taking to assess the link between the two types of
measures.
All analyses were run in R (R Core Team, 2015), and latent
growth curve modeling was performed using the lavaan package
(Rosseel, 2012).
Results
Differential Stability of Risk-Taking Propensity
Table 1 shows the test–retest correlations for domain-general
and domain-specific risk propensity (from 2004–2009, 2009–
2014, and 2004–2014) in the whole sample. For domain-general
risk propensity, rank-order stability ranged between r ! .45 and
.53. For domain-specific risk-taking propensity, rank-order stabil-
ity was likewise moderate to high, with rs ranging from .42 to .53
between 2004 and 2009, from .45 to .58 between 2009 and 2014,
and from .38 to .50 between 2004 and 2014. These results show
that individuals who reported high (or low) levels in risk-taking
propensity remained relatively high (or low) in risk-taking propen-
sity levels compared with others over time. To put these numbers
in perspective, many personality variables have shown stabilities
of more than .70 over periods of 1 to 5 years in adult samples
(Briley & Tucker-Drob, 2014; Costa & McCrae, 1994). Mean
stability in risk propensity was thus slightly lower than has been
found for standard personality variables.
Figure 3 shows the effect of age on rank-order stability for
different age cohorts, as measured by the test–retest correlations
across the three waves of assessment (see also Table 2). Although
there is some heterogeneity across domains, the typical pattern is
lower test–retest correlations in young adulthood (18–30 years of
age, r ! .30–.40), rising to a plateau in middle adulthood (r !
.40–.60), and decreasing again in older age (70–85 years of age,
r ! .25–30). Quadratic models of age best described the patterns
obtained from the test–retest correlations, and locally smoothed
lines deviated little from the quadratic model. The quadratic pat-
tern matches results of studies on the stability of personality traits,
with peak stability between the ages of 50 and 60 (Briley &
Tucker-Drob, 2014; Specht et al., 2011). The inverted U-shaped
pattern is typically attributed to social and biological changes that
generally occur at both ends of the life span, leading to increased
variation in phenotype in these phases. Findings in Figure 3
suggest that this pattern extends to risk-taking behavior and sim-
ilarly across domains.
Mean-Level Changes in Risk-Taking Propensity
We used latent growth curve models with up to nine (domain-
general) or three (domain-specific) measurement points to delin-
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7STABILITY AND CHANGE IN RISK-TAKING PROPENSITY
Figure 1. Model representation of the latent growth curve model used to analyze effects of age and sex on the
mean level (intercept) and mean-level change (slope) of self-reported domain-general (A) and domain-specific
(B) risk propensity (2004–2014). (A) At each measurement point (t1 to t11) one item was assessed. The latent
intercept (i) is fixed to 1 on t1, t3, t5, t6, t7, t8, t9, t10, and t11 and refers to the estimated mean frequency of
risk-taking propensity at t1. The latent slope (s) is fixed to 0.00 on t1, to 0.20 on t3, to 0.40 on t5, to 0.50 on
t6, to 0.60 on t7, to 0.70 on t8, 0.80 on t9, to 0.90 on t10, and to 1 on t11 and refers to the estimated mean
difference between two neighboring measurement points. Two-headed arrows represent correlations; single-
headed arrows, regression coefficients. Gender, age, age2, and age3 were included as predictors of (i) and (s). (B)
At each measurement point (t1, t6, t11) one item was assessed. The latent intercept (i) is fixed to 1 on t1, t6, and
t11 and refers to the estimated mean frequency of risk-taking propensity at t1. The latent slope (s) is fixed to 0.00
on t1, to 0.50 on t6, to 1 on t11 and refers to the estimated mean difference between two neighboring
measurement points. Two-headed arrows represent correlations; single-headed arrows, regression coefficients.
Gender, age, age2, and age3 were included as predictors of (i) and (s).
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8 JOSEF ET AL.
eate the effect of age and sex on mean level as well as mean-level
change in domain-general (N ! 44,076) and domain-specific risk-
taking propensity (N ! 11,903). Table 3 shows the parameter
estimates. All parameters were standardized to the first measure-
ment. Age was centered to the sample mean of 44.1 years of age.
Parameter estimates are given in 10-year units. All models took
nesting of individual data within households into account to cor-
rect for underestimation of standard errors due to clustered sam-
pling. Column one of Figure 4 (intercept) depicts the life span
trajectory of mean-level risk taking on a smoothed color density
representation of a scatterplot of age and risk-taking propensity,
obtained through a kernel density estimate (kernel width used for
density estimation ! 75). The second column (slope) of Figure 4
illustrates the effects of age and sex on slope estimates. The arrows
in the third column (intercept " slope) represent a combined
display of cross-sectional and longitudinal changes for separate
5-year cohorts.
Domain-General Risk-Taking Propensity
Cross-sectional effects. Overall, the results suggest that both
age and sex affect mean-level domain-general risk-taking propen-
sity (see Table 3, Figure 4a). Regarding age, the trajectory shows
a decline in risk taking across adulthood, with an average decrease
in risk-taking propensity of #0.17 points across 10 years. Females
consistently reported lower levels of risk taking across the life span
than males (#0.81 at the sample mean of 42.1 years of age). The
steepest declines were evident between 20 and 30 years of age
(#0.23 points decrease on the 11-point Likert scale).
Longitudinal effects. Age and sex also had a significant ef-
fect on mean-level change in risk-taking propensity over time (see
Figure 2. Bivariate latent growth curve model of risk-taking propensity and the Big Five personality traits. The
observed variables t1, t6, and t11 (and t1, t5, and t10) represent the repeated measurements of risk-taking
propensity (left) and the Big Five personality traits (right). Whereas risk-taking propensity was measured by one
item, three items for each trait measured the Big Five. Therefore, for personality, the measurements at t1, t5, and
t10 were again latent factors composed of these three items. Two-headed arrows represent correlations,
single-headed arrows regression coefficients. The latent intercept (i) is fixed to 1 on t1, t5/t6, t10/t11 and refers
to the estimated mean frequency of risk-taking propensity at t1. The latent slope (s) is fixed to 0.00 on t1, to 0.50
on t5/t6, and to 1 on t10/t11 and refers to the estimated mean difference between two neighboring measurement
points. Age was included as predictors of - (i) and (s).
Table 1
Differential Stability (r) of Risk-Taking Propensity
(r)
04–09 09–14 04–14
General .45 .53 .47
Driving .53 .58 .50
Financial .47 .50 .42
Recreational .52 .56 .50
Occupational .46 .49 .42
Health .42 .45 .38
Social .42 .46 .43
Note. All correlations were significant at p $ .001.
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9STABILITY AND CHANGE IN RISK-TAKING PROPENSITY
Figure 4b, slope). Specifically, age had a quadratic effect on
change in risk-taking propensity, with an overall decline across the
life span: Decline in risk-taking propensity was shown to diminish
until the age of about 60, after which change in risk-taking pro-
pensity showed larger decreases again. As Figure 4c (intercept !
slope) shows, the cross-sectional results largely coincided with the
longitudinal analysis, in that change in slope across the life span
substantially corresponded with the cross-sectional pattern of
mean-level change. Toward the end of the life span, however,
slight deviations emerged between the longitudinal and cross-
sectional results, with considerable stability in risk propensity for
individuals older than 60 years but differences between cohorts
(i.e., consecutive arrows for each 5-year cohort do not exactly
match-up). One interpretation of this mismatch is that these find-
ings represent “survivor” effects—that is, a type of cohort or
attrition effect, whereby the least risk-taking respondents survive
and continue to participate in the panel.
Domain-Specific Risk-Taking Propensity
Cross-sectional effects. Overall, the results show strong ef-
fects of age and sex on mean-level risk-taking propensity (see
Table 3; Figure 4 column 1, intercept). Regarding age, the results
show that mean risk-taking levels decreased across the life span in
all domains. However, age-related changes followed different
mean trends depending on the domain. In the social domain,
risk-taking propensity followed a linear trend across the life span,
decreasing "0.16 points on the Likert scale over 10 years (Figure
4s). In the driving domain, it showed a quadratic pattern of decline,
with the highest risk-taking levels between 20 and 30 years of age
and steady, but accelerating, decreases over the following decades.
In the financial, recreational, occupational, and health domains,
risk-taking propensity followed a cubic pattern across the life span
(Figure 4g, 4j, 4m, and 4p): Financial and health risk-taking
propensity showed only slight mean-level decreases until age 55
years but a steeper decrease in the following decades. Recreational
risk-taking propensity showed continuous declines across the life
span, but the steepest decline was evident until about 40 years of
age. Occupational risk taking also showed a continuously declin-
ing pattern until the age of 65 years. Interestingly, the smallest
mean-level decreases in risk-taking propensity emerged in the
social domain (linear decrease of "0.16 points on the 11-point
Likert scale per decade). Regarding sex, women consistently re-
ported lower average levels of risk-taking propensity than men
across all domains: "1.21 points lower in driving, "0.97 in
financial, "1.02 in recreational, "0.83 in occupational, "0.85 in
health, and "0.26 in social risk-taking propensity at age 42.1 (see
Table 3).
Longitudinal effects. Figure 4 (column 2, slope) illustrates
the effects of age and sex on mean-level change in domain-specific
risk-taking propensity. The effects of age on change in risk-taking
Figure 3. The effect of age on rank-order stability of risk-taking propensity.
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10 JOSEF ET AL.
propensity in the occupational and recreational domain were best
described by a cubic pattern. Change in occupational risk taking
has its point of largest decrease at about 50 years of age. Change
in recreational risk taking decreased across the life span but the
smallest decreases were at about 40 years of age. For both do-
mains, the longitudinal findings are largely consistent with the
cross-sectional results: Changes in slope mapped onto the pattern
of mean-level change (see Figure 4l/4o). For recreational risk-
taking propensity, however, slight discrepancies emerged between
cross-sectional and longitudinal change, possibly attributable to
dropout of older adults or to older adults ceasing to engage in risky
recreational activities. Importantly, age was not a significant pre-
dictor of changes in financial, health, and social risk-taking pro-
pensity, with individuals of all ages showing only very small but
constant change in risk-taking propensity over time (change
of !0.049 in financial, !0.006 in health, and " 0.009 in social
risk taking over 10 years). For health risk-taking propensity, slight
discrepancies between longitudinal and cross-sectional results
emerged toward the end of the life span (Figure 4r; starting #60
years of age). These results may again point to a survivor effect,
with respondents who took fewest risks in these domains also
living longer. In the domain of driving, change in risk-taking
propensity was linear and generally increased over time at all ages
but less so in older ages. One possible interpretation of this
increase is that it reflects an effect of increased perceived compe-
tence in driving on risk taking: Over time, individuals may change
their perceptions of risk or their individual level of perceived
control over their driving skills and thus report riskier behavior;
this tendency, however, diminishes in old age. Future work is
necessary that replicates and tests this admittedly speculative in-
terpretation.
Individual-Level Changes in Risk-Taking Propensity
Analysis of the latent growth curve models above suggested that
there were considerable individual differences in change in risk-
taking propensity (significant variance of slope estimates). We
now examine to what extent individual differences in variation in
change were associated with changes in personality and situational
(i.e., income) variables. The rationale for these analyses is that
understanding the covariates of change may help to understand the
mechanisms underlying life span changes in risk-taking propen-
sity.
We used bivariate latent growth curve models to estimate cor-
related change between domain-specific risk-taking propensity and
variables of interest (i.e., the Big Five, income). Standardized
estimates of covariance between slopes are shown in Table 4. The
results show that within-person change in risk-taking propensity
was positively associated with within-person change in Extraver-
sion and Openness to Experience and negatively correlated with
change in Conscientiousness, Neuroticism, and Agreeableness.
These associations showed variation across domains, with no
strong patterns of association between specific risk-taking domains
and personality factors. For example, change in Openness to
Experience was positively correlated with change in recreational
(r$ .28), occupational (r$ .21), and social domains (r$ .21) andTa
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Figure 4. Age-differences in mean levels (intercepts) and mean-level changes (slopes). Arrows (intercept !
slope) represent a combined display of age differences in intercepts and slopes for 11 different cohorts. Red
line " female, blue line " male. Single black line " no sex difference. All curves in the Intercept plots (a, d,
g, j, m, p, s) are plotted on a kernel density plot in which darker red colors indicate higher density of responses
(kernel width used for density estimation " 75). General risk propensity (N " 44,076). Driving risk propensity
(N " 11,903). Financial risk propensity (N " 11,903). Recreational risk propensity (N " 11,903). Occupational
risk propensity (N " 11,903). Health risk propensity (N " 11,903). Social risk propensity (N " 11,903).
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13STABILITY AND CHANGE IN RISK-TAKING PROPENSITY
in general risk taking (r ! .24). To put these numbers into
perspective, intercorrelations of slope estimates between the dif-
ferent risk domains ranged between .42 and .72 (see Table 4).
In sum, these results suggest that within-person changes in
standard personality factors are linked to within-person changes in
risk-taking propensity, although less strongly than the changes
found across risk-taking domains. In contrast, within-person
changes in risk-taking propensity showed no significant associa-
tions with changes in individual income over time. Overall, these
results suggest that—and this may be surprising from a classic
economic expectation about the relationship between risk aversion
and wealth—life span changes in risk-taking propensity are more
closely related to life span changes in personality than to changes
in economic factors such as income.
Life Span Trajectory of Social and Nonsocial Risk
Taking in Behavioral Tasks
We used regression models to probe for age differences in the
cross-sectional samples of respondents who completed behavioral
risk measures (Fehr et al., 2002; Holt & Laury, 2002). Figure 5
shows the life span trajectories. In the monetary lottery, we found
a significant quadratic relation between age and risk taking (i.e.,
choosing the risky over the safe option) with evident decreases in
risk taking from about 30 years of age. Respondents aged between
18 and 30 years, switched from preferring the lottery to the safe
amount when the latter amounted to, on average, €93.6; for re-
spondents aged between 70 and 85 years, the safe amount pre-
ferred over the lottery shrank to about half this amount (€44.7). In
the trust game, in contrast, we found linear effects of age but
overall relatively stable levels of risk taking across the life span
(i.e., entrusting money to the other party and hoping for recipro-
cation).
These results suggest that, similar to self-reported risk propen-
sity, behavioral risk taking shows different trends across different
economic tasks (see Table 5). Furthermore, the overall pattern of
mean-level differences in risk taking in the respective domains
roughly matches between self-report and behavioral measures.
Most interestingly, for both self-report and behavioral measures,
we find no discernable link between age and risk taking in the
social domain. Note, however, that the correlations between the
two types of measures are small. For the subset of individuals for
whom we have data on both the trust game and self-reported
risk-taking propensity (N! 676), we found only small correlations
between self-report on risky (trust) behavior, rs ! [.08–.18] in
2004. The correlation between domain-general risk-taking propen-
sity and risky behavior in the gamble experiment collected in 2005
was only slightly higher, r ! .24. With regard to correlations with
the Big Five personality traits the pattern is similar, with highest
correlations between openness to experience and behavior in the
gamble experiment, r ! .15 (see Table 6).
Table 4
Correlated Change: Correlations Among Slopes in Bivariate Latent Growth Curve Models of Risk-Taking Propensity, the Big Five
Personality Traits, and Income
General Driving Financial Recreational Occupational Health Social
Risk taking propensities
General
Driving .54!!!
Financial .58!!! .65!!!
Recreational .61!!! .66!!! .64!!!
Occupational .59!!! .54!!! .59!!! .72!!!
Health .51!!! .58!!! .56!!! .65!!! .64!!!
Social .47!!! .42!!! .49!!! .56!!! .42!!! .55!!!
The Big Five
Extraversion .22!! .04 .03 .10 .15!! .10 .13!
Openness .24!!! .03 .04 .28!!! .21!!! .12! .21!
Conscientiousness .03 ".07 ".11 ".09 ".003 ".06 ".24!!!
Neuroticism ".23!!! ".01 ".04 ".19! .06 ".02 ".23!!
Agreeableness ".11 ".12! ".18! ".28!!! ".12! ".10 ".02
Income ".001 ".02 .05 ".08 ".01 .06 ".04
Note. Estimates were obtained from bivariate latent growth curve models and the respective correlation between slope estimates between a particular risk
domain and the variable of interest (Big Five traits, income). Note also that the effects reported are ambiguous in direction as they represent correlations
of changes.
! p # .05. !! p # .01. !!! p # .001.
Figure 5. Age differences in mean-levels of behavioral risk taking (cross-
sectional data). Single black line ! no sex difference. (a) Lottery experi-
ment (N ! 433). (b) Trust experiment (N ! 646).
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Discussion
How does risk-taking propensity change across adulthood? We
examined this question by analyzing (a) differential stability, (b)
mean-level differences, and (c) predictors of individual-level
change in self-reported risk-taking propensity across adulthood, as
well as (d) the correspondence between the life span trajectories of
self-report and behavioral measures of social and nonsocial risk
taking. We took advantage of data from a longitudinal multicohort
survey of individuals between 18 and 85 years of age including
subsamples of respondents who provided self-report ratings of
general and domain-specific risk-taking propensity (driving, finan-
cial, recreational, occupational, health, social) and completed be-
havioral measures of social (trust game) or nonsocial risk taking
(monetary gamble). Next, we discuss the results in light of the four
main issues outlined above, discuss some of the limitations of the
current investigation, and suggest broad implications and direc-
tions for future work.
Differential Stability of Risk-Taking Propensity
Differential stability represents the degree to which relative
differences between individuals are preserved over time. To our
knowledge, our study is the first to systematically investigate
stability in rank-order positioning of self-reported risk propensity
across adulthood. We also investigated differential stability in
specific domains. The results echo the inverted U-curved pattern of
stability from young to old adulthood that has been reported for
major personality factors (i.e., Big Five; Briley & Tucker-Drob,
2014; Ferguson, 2010; Roberts & DelVecchio, 2000). Across all
domains, stability coefficients in risk-taking propensity increased
from young to middle adulthood before declining again in older
age. This trajectory is largely consistent with the idea that lower
stability is to be expected in developmental periods involving
significant biological, cognitive, and social changes/demands.
More work is necessary to uncover the specific biological and
environmental factors that lead to this particular life span pattern.
One possible conclusion from our results is that life span differ-
ences in rank-order stability are relatively homogenous across
risk-taking domains. Consequently, future studies may want to
consider factors that are common to different areas of life—be
they biological changes due to maturation and senescence or the
adoption of specific social roles.
Mean-Level Changes in Risk-Taking Propensity
Our study is unique in capturing general and domain-specific
risk taking longitudinally across multiple waves spanning up to 10
years. Importantly, our results allowed us to compare longitudinal
and cross-sectional estimates of mean-level change in risk-taking
propensity: The results suggest that cross-sectional and longitudi-
nal data roughly coincide in showing a decrease in risk-taking
propensity with increased age. Indeed, driving was the only do-
main that yielded a substantial discrepancy between cross-
sectional and longitudinal trends (with the latter showing an atyp-
ical increase in risk taking over time). Consequently, taken as a
whole, our results suggest that previous estimates obtained from
cross-sectional data largely capture longitudinal changes in risk-
taking propensity (Bonem et al., 2015; Dohmen et al., 2011; Roalf
et al., 2012; Rolison et al., 2014; Rosman et al., 2013; Schwartz et
al., 2013). Importantly, the normative decreases of mean-level
trends in risk-taking propensity are consistent with what behav-
ioral ecology would predict about age (and sex) differences in risk
taking against the background of differential incentives for repro-
ductive competition across the life span (and between the sexes;
e.g., Daly & Wilson, 1997).
The pattern of normative age-related decline varied as a function
of life domain, with some domains (e.g., social) proving relatively
stable across adulthood. Future work needs to provide a theoretical
rationale for potential qualitative differences between domains.
One possibility is to determine the extent to which particular
domains or risky activities should and can be avoided in different
phases of life. For example, abstaining from climbing ladders or
Table 6
Correlations Between Self-Reported and Behavioral Measures
of Risk
Variable
Lottery Trust
r n r n
Risk taking propensities
General .24!!! 433 .13!! 646
Driving — — .14! 322
Financial — — .13! 322
Recreational — — .17! 322
Occupational — — .18! 322
Health — — .08 322
Social — — .17! 322
The Big Five
Extraversion .08 433 — —
Openness .15!! 433 — —
Conscientiousness !.04 433 — —
Neuroticism .04 433 — —
Agreeableness !.09 433 — —
Note. The lottery game was assessed together with the domain-general
risk item in a pretest of the SOEP in 2005. We can therefore not provide
correlations with the domain-specific risk-propensity items. The trust game
was assessed in 2004 and allowed correlations with the domain-specific
and the domain-general risk items but not the Big Five. n " cases used for
the correlations.
! p # .05. !! p # .01. !!! p # .001.
Table 5
Regression Models Describing the Effect of Chronological Age
and Sex on Economic Games Involving Social and
Nonsocial Risks
Model
Lottery
(N " 433)
Trust
(N " 646)
b p b p
Intercept 96.36 [4.958] #.001 5.405 [.142] #.001
Age !7.597 [1.610] #.001 !.205 [.060] .001
Age2 !2.803 [.943] .003
Age3
Sex !5.36 [5.614] .339 .078 [.200] .696
AIC 4753 3044
R2 .064 .015
Note. Sex was dummy coded (1" female, 0" male). Values in brackets
indicate standard errors. Lottery " nonsocial risk, Trust " social risk. The
age range of both samples was restricted to 18–85 years. Age was
mean-centered at sample means. Values for age are given in 10-year units.
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15STABILITY AND CHANGE IN RISK-TAKING PROPENSITY
standing on chairs can reduce the risk of falls at home and may be
an adaptive strategy in older age (Brandtstädter, Wentura, &
Rothermund, 1999; Duke, Leventhal, Brownlee, & Leventhal,
2002). In contrast, interpersonal exchange is a key domain that
people hardly can escape from with age. These results also fit ideas
about social and emotional involvement across the life span, at
large. That is, past research has shown that social and emotional
information remains prioritized with respect to broader life goals
across adulthood (Carstensen, 1995; Carstensen, Isaacowitz, &
Charles, 1999). In addition, despite thinning of social network size,
there is evidence that older individuals continue to be socially
engaged more frequently and more emotionally with their closest
relationships compared to younger adults (Fredrickson &
Carstensen, 1990). Overall, it may be important to investigate
whether patterns of stability in social risk taking are related to the
cultural and biological roles of seniors as both recipients of social
support (Baltes, 1997) and donors of care to progeny (Coall &
Hertwig, 2010). More generally, going forward, studies that in-
vestigate specific risk-taking behaviors and assess the causes un-
derlying the adoption or cessation of these behaviors across adult-
hood are warranted.
Individual-Level Changes in Risk-Taking Propensity
Identifying covariates of age differences in risk taking may offer
insights into the mechanisms underlying change in risk propensity
across the life span. We have contributed to this effort by assessing
the link between change in risk-taking propensity and situational
or psychological characteristics hypothesized to vary with risk
taking: income (Dohmen et al., 2011) and personality (Becker et
al., 2012; Borghans et al., 2008). Individual-level change in risk-
taking propensity was weakly and not significantly correlated with
within-person changes in income. However, within-person change
in risk-taking propensity was moderately correlated with within-
person change in some Big Five personality factors. More con-
cretely, we found positive associations between within-person
change in Extraversion and Openness to Experiences and negative
associations between within-person change in Conscientiousness,
Neuroticism, and Agreeableness and within-person change in risk-
taking propensity.
One limitation of our work is that we did not analyze further
variables that have been suggested to be associated with individual
differences in risk taking, such as cognitive ability (Dohmen et al.,
2010), numeracy (Reyna, Nelson, Han, & Dieckmann, 2009),
affect (Peters, Hess, Västfjäll, & Auman, 2007), and risk percep-
tion (Bonem et al., 2015). The SOEP either does not include these
variables or has not yet gathered enough longitudinal data (i.e.,
cognitive ability) for correlated changes to be estimated. Future
work including additional measurements in the SOEP and use of
other longitudinal surveys will be helpful in uncovering predictors
of change in risk taking over time.
Life Span Trajectories of Self-Report and Behavioral
Measures of Risk Taking
One of our goals was to assess whether self-report and behav-
ioral measures of risk taking converged in the estimated patterns of
life span mean-level trajectories in risk taking. We found that there
were indeed parallels between the trajectories of the self-report
measures and the two behavioral measures. Specifically, the de-
cline in self-reported risk-taking propensity in the financial domain
was matched by behavior in the monetary gamble. Similarly, a
relatively flat trajectory of risk-taking propensity in the self-
reported social domain matched results obtained from the behav-
ioral trust game. However, when we estimated the cross-sectional
correlations between self-report and behavioral results, we found
that most correlations between self-report and behavioral measures
were small. Naturally, the small correlations between behavioral
and self-report measures of trust could stem from confounds
present in the specific behavioral games used, such as the trust
game, because factors such as mentalizing abilities and altruistic
preferences may trump or confound the role of risk-taking prefer-
ences (Rilling & Sanfey, 2011). More broadly, although our work
raises the possibility that both self-report and behavioral measures
capture similar aspects of mean-level changes in risk-taking pro-
pensity with increased age, further work is needed to quantify the
overlap between different behavioral and self-report measures (see
Appelt et al., 2011; Friedman et al., 2014; Mishra & Lalumière,
2011; Szrek et al., 2012).
Limitations
One main limitation of our work is that we have not investigated
the links between risk preferences and real-world outcomes. To
our knowledge, there has only been one past effort to use one wave
of the SOEP database to predict real-world behavior in the finan-
cial domain (Dohmen et al., 2011), but these efforts could be
extended to include other waves. A limitation of both past work
and any future efforts with these data will be that they do not
include objective measures of respondents’ real-world behavior.
The SOEP, for instance, relies almost exclusively on self-report
assessments of behavior rather than on observational or registry
data. Recent studies have shown the feasibility of complementing
self-report assessments with objective real-world assessments,
such as health markers (Moffitt et al., 2011) or financial reports (Li
et al., 2015). Showing predictive value of current risk-taking
propensity measures for real-world behavior would remove poten-
tial doubts about the validity of the single-item measures in the
present investigation. Future work with large representative lon-
gitudinal surveys should therefore combine self-report and behav-
ioral measures with objective measures of risk-taking behavior,
such as those associated with financial behavior.
Implications for Conceptions of Risk Taking
and Future Research
What is risk taking? Our results may not afford a definite answer
but they suggest some more and some less surprising regularities
that a comprehensive theory of risk taking will have to meet. First,
they suggest that risk taking is not a purely situation-specific
response pattern and can, instead, be considered a trait with a level
of rank-order stability across individuals that is only slightly below
that of major personality dimensions (Briley & Tucker-Drob,
2014; Roberts & DelVecchio, 2000). Furthermore, like those per-
sonality dimensions, its pattern of differential stability obeys an
inverted U-shape such that the periods of young adulthood and old
age reveal least stability. Second, like other personality dimen-
sion—such as openness to experience—it shows mean-level de-
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16 JOSEF ET AL.
creases with age (Lucas & Donnellan, 2011; Specht, Egloff, &
Schmukle, 2011). This, however, only holds as long as the risk-
taking propensity is probed in an abstract and domain-general
fashion. Notable variations in mean-level risk taking emerge
across domains, such as in the relatively stable pattern of risk
taking across the life span observed for the social domain. To
what extent these variations stem from a stable trait but chang-
ing domain-specific perceptions of costs and benefits or rather
from domain-specific traits with somewhat unique age trajec-
tories remains an open question for future research. Third, and
finally, we found that life span changes in risk-taking propen-
sity are more closely related to life span changes in personality
than to changes in economic circumstances such as income. All
in all, these results highlight the need for a better understanding
of the links between risk-taking propensities, personality struc-
ture, and the mechanisms or sources of personality development
at large.
Although risk-taking tendencies have long been within the pur-
view of personality theories, they have, regrettably, been investi-
gated under different banners, including sensation seeking (Cross,
Cyrenne, & Brown, 2013; Zuckerman & Kuhlman, 2000) and
impulsivity (Cross, Copping, & Campbell, 2011; Sharma, Markon,
& Clark, 2014). Understanding the relationship between the dif-
ferent constructs and how they are linked to major personality
factors will require both theoretical and empirical work. As men-
tioned above, we see potential for convergence by examining the
empirical links between major (i.e., Big Five) personality factors
and risk-taking propensity. For example, there has been consider-
able progress in understanding individual differences in life events
(Kandler, Kornadt, Hagemeyer, & Neyer, 2014; Specht et al.,
2011), cognitive development (Klimstra, Bleidorn, Asendorpf, van
Aken, & Denissen, 2013), and cross-cultural variation in social
roles (Bleidorn et al., 2013). Such methods could also be
applied to understanding the development of risk taking and to
determine parallels between the development of Big Five per-
sonality factors and specific risk-taking behaviors. We have
partly initiated this effort by investigating how age differences
in risk taking vary across different countries and thus are a
function of the affordances of local ecologies (Mata et al., in
press), a message that matches previous results on the life span
development of major personality dimensions (Bleidorn et al.,
2013). Yet another possible future step in understanding the
development of risk-taking propensity and links to other per-
sonality dimensions would be to assess the role of general
proximal mechanisms that can account for global effects that
we reported across domains and personality factors, including
potential changes in neurotransmitter systems (Buckholtz et al.,
2010; Düzel, Bunzeck, Guitart-Masip, Düzel, 2010) or hor-
monal profiles (Mehta, Welker, Ziliolic, & Carré 2015).
Conclusion
We investigated the stability and change in risk-taking propen-
sity across the life span and found that risk taking can be thought
of as a trait that changes significantly across the life span and
similarly, albeit with exceptions, across different domains of life.
Future work is now needed to uncover the underlying sources of
domain-specificity in the development of risk-taking propensity
and assessing more closely the empirical and theoretical links
between risk taking and other personality factors.
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Appendix
Overview of Assessment of Self-Report and Behavioral Measures of Risk
Variable 2004 2005 2006 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 N
Risk propensities
General x x x x x x x x x 44,076
Driving x x x 11,903
Financial x x x 11,903
Recreational x x x 11,903
Occupational x x x 11,903
Health x x x 11,903
Social x x x 11,903
The Big Five
Extraversion x x x 11,903
Openness x x x 11,903
Conscientiousness x x x 11,903
Neuroticism x x x 11,903
Agreeableness x x x 11,903
Income x x x x x x x x x x 11,903
Experiments
Lottery game x 433
Trust game x 646
Note. The lottery game was assessed in a pretest of the SOEP in 2005 and also included the domain-general risk-taking propensity item but not the
domain-specific items.
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Abstract 
Concordant evidence from survey and self-report measures suggests that the 
propensity to take risks decreases as a function of age but that the specific pattern differs 
across life domains. Yet, extant efforts to investigate the psychological mechanisms 
underlying these age-related changes or potential differences between domains are still scarce. 
Especially representative surveys, albeit providing a rich and representative data source, 
assess no psychological variables leaving open their explanatory power for such age-related 
trends. Using items from the risk aversion scale used in the German Socioeconomic Panel 
(SOEP), we investigated the extent to which changes in the perception of risks and benefits as 
well as perceived control may act as psychological mechanisms behind age-related changes in 
risk propensity. We conducted a representative survey (regarding sex, age, and education) of 
the population living in Germany and assessed risk-taking propensity, risk perception, 
expected benefits, and control beliefs associated with various domains of life, such as driving, 
financial, recreational, occupational, health, and social domains (N = 1,786). The results show 
that age is associated with (i) decreased self-reported risk propensity, (ii) perceived risk, and 
(iii) expected benefits of risky activities, but not perceived control. Changes in perceived risks 
and benefits, but not control beliefs, were able to account for the lifespan patterns in risk-
taking propensity. Overall, our results support the view that domain-specific perceptions of 
benefits and risk vary across individuals and age cohorts and inform estimates of risk-taking 
propensity. 
 
Keywords: risk taking, adult lifespan, domain specificity, risk perception, expected benefit, 
control belief 
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Age Differences in Risk-Taking Propensity Are Related to Perceptions of Risk and Reward 
but not Perceived Control 
With life expectancy increasing around the globe, more and more older individuals are 
forced to reckon with risk and uncertainty in the financial, health, and other domains 
(Agarwal, Driscoll, Gabaix, & Laibson, 2009; Vaupel, 2014). A common view on aging is 
that it is accompanied with more caution and increased risk aversion (e.g., Botwinik, 1966; 
Calhoun & Hutchinson, 1981; Okun, 1976; Quetelet, 1842). This conforms with evidence 
from survey and self-report measures that show an overall decrease in risk-taking propensity 
with advancing age (Dohmen, Huffman, Schupp, Falk, Sunde, & Wagner, 2011; Mandal & 
Roe, 2014; Roalf, Mitchell, Harbaugh, & Janowsky, 2011; Rolison, Hanoch, Wood, & Liu, 
2013; Rosman, Garcia, Lee, Butler, & Schwartz, 2013). Despite such a general trend of age-
related decrease in self-reported risk propensity, patterns of age-related change vary 
considerably across domains, such as recreational, financial, or social domains (Bonem, 
Ellsworth, & Gonzalez, 2015; Josef, Richter, Samanez-Larkin, Wagner, Hertwig, & Mata, in 
press; Roalf et al. 2011; Rolison et al., 2013; Rosman et al. 2013; Schwartz et al., 2013). For 
example, while older individuals may forego certain dangerous recreational activities–say 
bungee jumping or mountain biking–other activities such as taking the risk of trusting and 
relying on others may remain indispensible or even increasingly important in older age, thus 
contributing to differential decline in risk-taking propensity across domains. Regrettably, 
investigations of the psychological mechanisms behind these age-related and domain-specific 
changes are still scarce (Bonem et al., 2015; Roalf et al., 2012; Rosman et al., 2013). 
Especially panel data sets provide a rich data source for the investigation of developmental 
trends of self-reported risk taking propensity but provide no variables to test the psychological 
background of such changes. We here aim to fill this gap and to provide an explanation as to 
why aging leads to, in general, decreased risk-taking propensity and does so differentially for 
separate life domains. In particular, we test the extent to which individual differences in the 
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perceptions of risks, benefits and control can account for the domain-specific age-related 
patterns in risk taking using survey items adopted from the German Socioeconomic Panel 
Study (SOEP). 
A cost-benefit approach to risk taking 
The risk-return framework suggests that individual and domain differences in risk 
taking are a function of a risky behavior’s perceived risks/costs and its expected benefits 
(Figner & Weber, 2011; Hanoch, Johnson, & Wilke, 2006; Weber, Blais, & Betz, 2002). To 
measure those perceptions across a number of risky behaviors in different life domains, 
Weber and colleagues developed a Domain-Specific Risk-Taking Scale in which risk taking is 
measured together with two additional scales assessing perceived risks and expected benefits 
of specific risky activities (DOSPERT; Blais & Weber, 2006; Weber et al., 2002). Using this 
questionnaire, previous research has found robust effects of individual differences in risk 
perceptions and expected benefits on self-reported risk taking. For example, women’s overall 
lower level of risk taking shows to be linked to their higher risk perception and lower 
expectation of benefits of taking risks (Byrnes, Miller, & Schafer, 1999; Harris, Jenkins, & 
Glaser, 2006). Aging is associated with normal changes in resources, such as decline in 
cognitive and physical abilities and the social network (e.g. death of spouse). Experiencing 
such decline across domains, the overall behavior motivation may alter from a primary focus 
of accruing gains to preventing or slowing down losses (Baltes, 1997; Baltes & Smith, 2003). 
This change likely influences older individuals’ expectations about the benefits and costs of 
engaging in certain behaviors. Consequently, the risk-return framework would suggest that 
changes in perceived costs and benefits could account for observed age and sex differences in 
risk-taking propensity in different domains of life. 
How are perceptions and risk-taking behaviors conjoined? Risk taking and perceived 
benefits of a specific behavior are likely to be positively associated: Individuals are more 
prone to engage in risky behaviors that promise higher rewards. The link between the 
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perception of how risky an activity is and the willingness to engage in it is less 
straightforward. Perceiving an activity to be risky may be negatively associated with risk 
taking because activities perceived to be highly risky may exceed an individuals’ threshold 
for possible losses (Blais & Weber, 2006). Consequently, age-related decreases in risk taking 
may co-occur with increases in the perception of risks and feelings of vulnerability to 
negative outcomes (Bonem et al., 2015; Moser, Spagnoli, & Santos-Eggimann, 2011). At the 
same time, risk and reward are often positively correlated (Pleskac & Hertwig, 2014) and 
positive correlations between risk taking and risk perception have been observed in the 
literature (e.g., Johnson, McCaul, & Klein, 2002; Mills, Reyna, & Estrada, 2008, Weinstein, 
1988). Individuals who engage in risky activities, say, unprotected sex or mountain biking 
may very well realize their potential costs but still engage in them because of their perceived 
benefits or because they underestimate the chance of possible negative consequences to 
themselves. For example, some older adults may be aware of the potential dangers associated 
with driving but still engage in it because of its perceived benefits (e.g., individual mobility). 
Alternatively, age may decrease risk perception due to changes in the available set of risky 
behaviors (e.g. older adults may not drive at night and keep more distance to other drivers and 
thus reduce their overall level of risk taking). 
The role of control beliefs 
Another psychological dimension that may underlie risk taking is the belief about the 
own ability to influence and control life circumstances, that is, the perceived level of control 
(Bandura, 2006; Skinner, 1996). This belief has been identified as an important determinant 
of risk perceptions (Slovic, 1987; Ruthig, Chipperfield, Bailis, & Perry, 2008). Individuals 
engaging in risky activities tend to perceive higher control over the respective behavior 
(Nordgren, van der Pligt, & van Harreveld, 2007). Since diverse physical and cognitive 
resources decline in old age (Lindenberger, 2014; Salthouse, 2010), older adults may sense a 
concurrent decline in perceived control in those domains most affected by declining resources 
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(Baltes & Smith, 2003). Alternatively, however, it has been argued that notwithstanding older 
age, individuals are able to maintain a relatively constant level of perceived control. They do 
so by adapting their strategies to exert control and adjusting their standards of comparison. 
Consequently, aging does not necessarily lead to reduced perceived control across the board 
(Heckhausen, Wrosch, & Schulz, 2010); instead, decline in perceptions of control vary across 
roles and domains (Krause, 2007; Lachman & Weaver, 1998; McAvay, Seeman, & Rodin, 
1996). For example, Lachman and Weaver showed an increase in perceived control over work 
and finances with increasing age, but a decrease in control over one’s relationship with 
children. This suggests that, depending on the domain, perceiving increasingly less control 
may be associated with a decreasing risk propensity in this domain. For instance, the less 
control people sense to have over their health with age (e.g., the development of cancer with 
age), the less they are willing to take risks (e.g., quit smoking; e.g. Windsor, Anstey, & 
Walker, 2008). Differences in risk-taking propensity between individuals and age groups may 
thus be prompted by concurrent differences in risk perceptions, expected benefits, and 
perceived control. 
Age-related changes in risk-taking propensity 
Concurrent research investigating age-related changes of self-reported risk-taking 
propensity has relied on two major sources of measurement to elicit risk preferences 
concerning different domains of life. One is via representative panel studies such as the 
German Socioeconomic Panel Study (SOEP, Wagner, Frick, & Schupp, 2007; Dohmen et al., 
2011); the second is via the domain-specific risk-taking propensity scale (DOSPERT, Weber, 
Blais, & Betz, 2002). Both data sources show converging evidence for reduced risk-taking 
propensity with advancing age across different life domains (Dohmen et al., 2011; Mandal & 
Roe, 2014; Roalf et al., 2011, Rolison et al., 2013; Rosman et al., 2013). Studies using the 
DOSPERT support the notion of an age-related increase in risk perceptions along with 
decreased expected benefits of risky actions that may explain this prominent decline of self-
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reported risk propensity across the lifespan (Bonem et al., 2015; Roalf et al., 2011). Recent 
work using longitudinal panel data from the SOEP showed that the longitudinal changes in 
different age cohorts are largely consistent with the prominent cross-sectional changes in most 
domains of life (Josef et al., in press). Regrettably, this panel data is mute about the 
psychological mechanisms driving these changes leaving open a direct test of the explanatory 
role of such psychological variables for age-related changes in self-reported risk taking. No 
study has yet explored the role of perceived control on risk taking in different domains across 
the lifespan. 
The current study aims to contribute to this issue. We collected an extensive cross-
sectional data set representative of the German population and asked individuals of different 
ages to report their risk-taking propensity along with their risk perceptions across a number of 
domains (i.e., driving, financial, recreational, occupational, health, and social). The risk items 
used were adapted from a risk aversion scale used in the German Socioeconomic Panel Study 
(SOEP). Our overall goal is to quantify the extent to which age differences in perceptions of 
rewards, risks, and controllability can account for the declining but domain-specific mean-
level changes of risk-taking propensity across the lifespan using such survey items.  
Methods 
Sample 
We commissioned a survey company (Gesellschaft fuer Konsumforschung, one of the 
largest commercial market research institutes in Europe, www.gfk.de) to conduct face-to-face 
and computer-assisted personalized interviews (CAPI) in a representative sample (on age, sex 
and education) of the population living in Germany (see Table 1 for demographic 
characteristics). Survey participation was voluntary and participants did not receive monetary 
compensation for their participation. The Ethics Committee of the Max Planck Institute for 
Human Development approved the data collection procedure, data utilization for research 
purposes, and confirmed accordance with German data protection regulations. Because 
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sample size in the initial sample for very young and very old ages were low (N < 15), we 
restricted our sample to an age range of 20-75 years of age (M = 49.5; SD = 14.8; 55% 
female) to avoid biasing estimates for extreme ages though outliers when estimating the age 
trajectories (N = 1,786; see Lucas & Donnellan, 2009, for a similar approach). More detailed 
information about the age distribution can be found in the Appendix (Table A1, Figure A1).  
Items and procedure 
Respondents were first asked to report risk-taking propensity separately for six 
different risk domains (driving, financial, recreational, occupational, health, and social risk 
taking) and on a general risk-taking propensity item. These items were adapted from those 
used in the risk aversion scale in the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP, www.leibniz-
soep.de; see also Dohmen et al., 2011), a large-scale representative survey of the population 
living in Germany. This scale comprises one item for general risk taking and six items 
covering domain-specific risk-taking propensity in the domains mentioned above. Since their 
first administration in the SOEP in 2004, the items – particularly the general risk-taking 
propensity item–have been used in numerous scientific analyses on risk taking (e.g., 
Benjamin et al. 2012; Bonin, Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, & Sunde, 2009; Lönnqvist, Verkasalo, 
Walkowitz, & Wichardt, 2011; Szrek, Chao, Ramlagen, & Peltzer, 2012). 
Following the risk items, participants were asked to report their perceived risk, 
expected benefits and control beliefs in each of the six life domains. The instructions for these 
items were adapted from the DOSPERT (German translation, see Johnson, Wilke, Weber, 
2004) to reliably differentiate between risk taking and perceptions of risk. The instructions of 
the perceived-control items were adapted from Lachman and Weaver (1998). The order of 
items was not randomized and thus the same for each participant. 
All items were accompanied by a 1–10 Likert scale, with the risk-taking propensity 
item running from “not at all willing to take risks” to “very willing to take risks”, and the 
remaining items from “not at all risky/no benefits at all/no control at all” to “extremely 
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risky/great benefits/everything under control” (see also Supplemental Materials file for the 
original items used). All respondents answered one item per domain after having read the 
following instructions for each item: 
(1) Risk taking: “People can behave differently in different situations. How would you 
rate your willingness to take risks in the following domains? For each one, please 
indicate your likelihood of engaging in a risky activity or behavior in this domain.”  
 (2) Perceived risk: “People often see some risk in situations that contain uncertainty 
about what the outcome or consequences will be and for which there is a possibility of 
negative consequences. However, riskiness is a very personal and intuitive notion, and 
we are interested in your gut level assessment of risk. How would you rate your 
intuitive notion of risk perception in these different domains?” 
(3) Expected benefits: “People often see some risk in situations that contains 
uncertainty about what the outcome or consequences will be and for which there is the 
possibility of negative consequences. Whether people engage in risky behavior or 
actions also depends on the expected benefits obtained from that behavior or action. 
For each of the following domains, please indicate the benefits you would obtain from 
a risky behavior or action in these domains.” 
(4) Control belief: “People often feel different levels of control over domains of life. 
How would you rate your personal level of perceived control in the domains listed 
below? Your answer represents your subjective estimate or feeling of control in this 
life domain.” 
Statistical analysis 
We first estimated the cross-sectional patterns of risk-taking propensity, risk 
perception, expected benefits and perceived control from young to old age in the six different 
domains in our sample. For this purpose, we used multiple regression models in R (RCore 
Team, 2015). Specifically, we followed a stepwise approach when considering the role of 
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different predictors, namely, age, sex, and their interactions on the dynamics of the dependent 
variable. First, we analyzed the relation of age by including age, age2, and age3 as covariates. 
Age was mean-centered and regression estimates therefore represent the dependent variable at 
the mean sample age (49.5 years of age). We decreased model complexity by testing for 
linear and quadratic age effects when the cubic effect was not significant and did not show 
significant improvement in model fit. We added sex as a covariate and the interaction of each 
of the age terms with sex to the model. We report the interactions of age and sex when they 
proved significant and provided significant increase in overall model fit. 
Second, we tested whether the covariates perceived risk, expected benefits, and control 
beliefs can account for the age-related patterns in risk-taking propensity. To do this, we 
included these variables as well as their interactions with each of the age terms as additional 
predictors into multiple regression models when predicting self-reported risk-taking 
propensity. 
The data file and R scripts documented in this manuscript are made publicly available 
(https://osf.io/gnkcu/). 
Results  
Lifespan trajectories of self-reported risk propensity 
We obtained both effects of age and sex on domain-general and domain-specific risk-
taking propensity (see Table 2). Figure 1 and 2 show the age patterns of the models reported 
in Table 2 superimposed on heat plots of the raw data obtained from kernel density estimates 
of the frequency of self-reported risk propensity for each age. Overall, age showed a negative 
correlation to self-reported risk-taking propensity levels in all domains. Domain-general risk-
taking propensity showed a quadratic age-related pattern with lowest risk-taking propensity 
ratings towards the end of the lifespan. The pattern for the domain-specific risk items, 
followed different age trends depending on the life domain. The steepest linear declines were 
evident in the recreational domain (–0.61 points decrease on the Likert scale per decade), 
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followed by the health and social domain (–0.27 points decrease in risk taking propensity per 
decade), and the financial domain (–0.24 points decrease in risk taking propensity per 
decade). Risk taking in the driving and occupational domain revealed a quadratic pattern of 
risk propensity across the lifespan. In particular, risk propensity in the driving domain showed 
slight increases until young adulthood (0.10 increase in risk-taking propensity until 30 years 
of age) followed by a steady decrease until old age (average of –0.43 points decrease per 
decade). Risk propensity in the occupational domain showed decreases from thirty years of 
age on: Mean-level differences were smallest between 20 and 30 years of age (–0.11 points 
decrease) relative to differences between the other decades (average of –0.61 points decrease). 
Independent of age trends, females reported on average lower levels of risk-taking propensity 
relative to males on all risk items. We also conducted similar analyses including a number of 
demographic control variables such as education, income, and occupational and marital status. 
All these led to a comparable pattern of results concerning the age and sex described above 
(see Supplemental Material Table S1). 
Notwithstanding these differences in the domain-dependent trajectories of risk 
propensity, the most general phenomenon is that self-reported risk-taking propensity 
decreases, in different ways, with age. Therefore, it is not surprising that one observes 
moderate inter-correlations of ratings between the different domains (ranging from r = .35 to 
r = .57; see Table 3). This suggests that there is substantial joint variance in the cross-
sectional ratings of risk taking propensity across the lifespan. Individuals that indicate to 
engage in risk in one domain also indicate to engage in risk in most other domains. Yet, 
correlations are slightly different in the different domains echoing the finding of domain-
specific lifespan trajectories of risk taking propensity. 
The explanatory role of perceptions 
Figure 2 (column 2-4) illustrates the lifespan patterns of perceptions of risk, benefits, 
and controllability. Overall, the results show substantial effects of age and sex on self-
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reported risk perception and expected benefits of risk. More precisely, perceptions of risk and 
benefits show steady declines across the adult lifespan but the declines are also different 
across domains. For example, while risk perception and expected benefits in the occupational 
domain followed a quadratic function across the lifespan, most other domains showed a linear 
decrease with age. Regarding sex the results show that females report overall lower levels of 
perceived risks and expected benefit relative to males. The results for perceptions of control 
are quite different though (Figure 2, column 4). Here we obtained only small effects of age 
and sex on self-reports with the level of perceived control proving relatively stable across the 
lifespan (see Supplemental Materials Table S2-4 file for regression estimates of age and sex 
on risk perceptions, expected benefits, and perceived control). Note that there are also 
significant correlations between ratings in different domains for risk perceptions (rs = .39–
.64), expected benefits (rs = .35–.53), and control beliefs (rs = .34–.53) indicating again 
substantial joint variance of these perceptions in different domains. 
To learn more about the explanatory role of perceptions of risk, benefits and 
controllability for risk propensity across the lifespan, we run separate regression analyses 
including these variables as well as their interaction with age as covariates. Overall, the 
results show that the inclusion of measures of perception eliminates the effects of age and 
thus the typical age-related pattern on risk-taking propensity across domains. Yet, regression 
estimates show that this can solely be attributed to the impact of the predictors of risk 
perception and expected benefit. Control beliefs, in contrast, do not show to be a significant 
predictor for risk-taking propensity in any of the domains (Table 4). Additional analyses that 
considered each predictor independently support this conclusion: Perceptions of risk and 
benefits, by themselves, can be used to reduce or eliminate age effects; this is not the case for 
control beliefs. Note that risk perceptions and expected benefits, the two significant 
predictors, are not redundant, with correlations ranging from .13 to .55 across the different 
domains (see Supplemental Materials file, Table S5). 
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Discussion 
There is converging evidence from self-report and representative panel data sets that 
aging goes along with domain-specific reductions in (self-reported) risk-taking propensity 
(Dohmen et al., 2011; Josef et al. in press; Mandal & Roe, 2014; Roalf et al., 2011; Rolison et 
al., 2013). The risk-return framework offers a psychological framework of domain- and age-
related differences in risk-taking propensity and there are a few studies that show that risk 
perceptions and expected benefits change significantly with age (e.g. Bonem et al., 2015; 
Rosman et al., 2013). Regrettably, existent evidence from survey data is mute about the 
psychological mechanisms driving these changes. Our goal was to examine the extent to 
which perceptions of risk, expected benefits, and controllability are associated with the typical 
pattern of age-related decline in risk-taking propensity and with different patters of decline 
between domains. To this end, we analyzed cross-sectional data from a large representative 
survey of adults between 20 and 75 years of age from Germany (N = 1,786) using items 
adapted from the German Socioeconomic Panel Study (SOEP). 
We found three major results consistent with results reported in previous studies. First, 
self-reported risk-taking propensity showed reliable mean-level decreases across the adult 
lifespan in both males and females. Second, the lifespan trajectories varied substantially 
depending on the domain, with some domains yielding flatter decline than others. 
Specifically, risk taking propensity in the social, financial, and health domain showed less 
pronounced declines across the adult lifespan relative to the recreational, occupational, and 
driving domains. Third, and most importantly, our results suggest that perceptions of risk and 
benefits, but not control beliefs, predict domain-dependent and age-related differences in risk-
taking propensity. The association between these perceptions, however, was contrary to what 
has been found previously in the literature.  
What explains both the default decline in the risk-taking propensity and somewhat 
domain-specific deviations from this default (Figure 2)? One possibility is that some domains 
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more than others afford the individual to more easily abandon risky activities and substitute 
them with others, without compromising quality of life. Attenuating risks by crowding out 
increasingly daring with less daring activities (e.g., mountain biking is swapped for hiking) is, 
in principle, an adaptive strategy with increasing age. It avoids unnecessary harm, thus 
making it easier to manage and maintain physical well-being and health (Brandtstädter, 
Wentura, & Rothermund, 1999; Duke, Leventhal, Brownlee, & Leventhal, 2002). Crowding 
out specific activities could also explain why, in general, perception-of-risk ratings do not 
grow with age but rather tend to decline (Figure 2). An individual would perhaps, perceive 
mountain biking as increasingly riskier when he or she gets older. Hiking, in contrast, may be 
perceived as less risky. The same principle may apply to perceived control: Swapping biking 
with hiking may maintain a relative high level of control albeit perhaps at the cost of less 
satisfaction or perceived benefits. Crowding out activities, however, has limits. Mountain 
bikes and motorcycles can be sold but the same logic may not apply to all domains. For 
interpersonal exchanges, financial activities, and health-related decisions this may be more 
difficult. Take, for instance, social risk taking such as trusting others. Social interactions and 
support may, if anything, be even more important with increased age (Baltes, 1997; Okun & 
Schultz, 2003; Seeman, Lusignolo, Albert, & Berkman, 2001). These results also fit ideas 
about social and emotional involvement across the lifespan, at large. That is, past research has 
shown that social and emotional information remains prioritized with respect to broader life 
goals across adulthood (Carstensen, 1995; Carstensen, Isaacowitz, & Charles, 1999). In 
addition, despite thinning of social network size, there is evidence that older individuals 
continue to be socially engaged more frequently and more emotionally with their closest 
relationships compared to younger adults (Fredrickson & Carstensen, 1990). 
What explains the somewhat different association between risk propensity and risk 
perceptions found in our present investigation? There is research arguing that preferences can 
be conceptualized as the product of memory representations and memory processes (Weber & 
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Johnson, 2006). That is, judgments about risks are formed by retrieving relevant knowledge 
about risks (e.g., attitudes, previous events, or activities) from memory. It is very likely that 
the quantity and quality of information that individuals have about risks in different domains 
of their life depends on the salience and accessibility of those particular risks in their 
environment and to their particular age group (Hertwig, Pachur, & Kurzenhäuser, 2005; 
Lichtenstein, Slovic, Fischhoff, Layman, & Combs, 1978). As noted above, depending on the 
domain, older people may substitute riskier and demanding activities, and the age-related and 
domain-specific changes in perceptions of risk, benefit and controllability are a function of 
the set of activities that are only partly overlapping for younger and older people and thus 
retrieved from memory. Another possibility is that older people continue (as much as 
possible) to engage in still the same activities but reduce their difficulty and risk levels (e.g., 
less demanding mountain bike tours), and the perceptions reflect these adjustments in 
difficulty. Still another possibility is that when individuals respond to questions related to 
their risk-taking propensity and perceptions thereof, they invoke age-related stereotypes and 
beliefs that are widespread in the population (Konradt, & Rothermund, 2011) rather than 
consulting their own behavior. In line with this idea, past research has shown that individuals 
have a much better representation about the risks faced by their own age group rather than the 
population at large (Benjamin, Dougan, & Buschena, 2001; Benjamin & Dougan, 1997). 
Further work is necessary to uncover the memory and judgment mechanism that 
underlie the link between risk perceptions and risk taking across the lifespan. For example, in 
order to examine which of these or other mechanisms is the most likely one, future studies 
will need to go beyond our procedure and those of numerous previous studies, namely, to 
have respondents judge and possibly even generate specific activities. By only specifying 
relatively broad domains, one leaves it up to the respondent to decide on what mnemonic 
basis he or she aims to construct an answer (e.g., sampling actual behaviors from memory; 
sampling stereotypes; sampling extreme and rare behavior or common and frequent behavior). 
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Clearly, general versus specific items can trigger different sets of representations that may, in 
turn, lead to varying correlations between perceived risks and benefits (Mills et al., 2008; 
Gerrard, Gibbons, & Bushman, 1996) and perceived control (Ruthig et al., 2003). This 
difference in item specificity, in turn, may drive the relationship between risk taking and 
perception across the lifespan. 
In sum, our and past results suggest a general declining trend in risk-taking propensity 
with age but also domain-specific changes in this default trajectory. What was largely 
unknown is what drives these commonalities and differences. We show that changes in 
perceived risks and benefits, but not control beliefs, were able to account for the observed 
domain-specific lifespan patterns in risk-taking propensity using items adapted from the 
German Socioeconomic Panel Study (SOEP). Uncovering the mechanisms underlying the 
perception of risks and benefits constitutes an important direction for future work necessary to 
understand the domain-specificity of age differences in risk taking.  
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Tables 
Table 1.  
Sample Characteristics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Education % 
   Lower secondary education 35.6 
   Middle school 44.3 
   Highschool  10.2 
   University studies 9.8 
   Missing 0.1 
Marital status  
   Single 18.8 
   Married 65.8 
   Widowed/divorced 15.5 
Occupational status  
   Employed (full- & part-time) 62.4 
   Unemployed 5.2 
   Retired 23.8 
   Housewife/-husband 4.6 
   In apprenticeship 0.1 
   At school/university 2.9 
Net monthly income  
   <499€ 8.1 
   500 – 749€ 5.2 
   750 – 999€ 14.2 
   1000 – 1249€ 8.3 
  1250 – 1499€ 15.2 
   1500 – 1999€ 12.4 
   2000 – 2499€ 9.6 
   2500 – 2999€ 3.1 
   3000 – 3499€ 2.1 
   3500 – 4999€ 0.8 
   <4000 1.3 
    Missing 19.7 
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Table 2 
Regression Models Describing the Effect of Chronological Age and Sex on Self-Reported Risk Propensity 
 General 
(N = 1,786) 
Driving  
(N = 1,786) 
Financial  
(N = 1,786) 
Recreational 
 (N = 1,786) 
Occupational 
 (N = 1,786) 
Health 
 (N = 1,786) 
Social 
 (N = 1,786) 
Effect Par. S.E. p Par. S.E. p Par. S.E. p Par. S.E. p Par. S.E. p Par. S.E. p Par. S.E. p 
 Intercept 5.031 .095 <.001 4.132 .101 <.001 3.016 .073 <.001 4.625 .086 <.001 4.781 .107 <.001 3.623 .083 <.001 4.526 083 <.001 
 Age –.056 .003 <.001 –.039 .003 <.001 –.024 .003 <.001 –.061 .004 <.001 –.060 .004 <.001 –.027 .004 <.001 –.027 .004 <.001 
 Age2 –.001 .0002 .008 –.001 .0002 .001       –.001 .0002 <.001       
 Sex –1.071 .106 <.001 –1.089 .113 <.001 –.565 .098 <.001 –.848 .114 <.001 –.651 .119 <.001 –.574 .111 <.001 –.354 .111 .001 
AIC  7190  7405  6952 7474  7581  7376 7363 
BIC  7217  7432  6974 7496  7608  7397 7385 
R2  .172  .110  .049 .157  .132  .045 .004 
 
Note. Age was mean-centered at the sample mean of 49.5 years; sex was dummy-coded (1 = female, 0 = male). Par. = Parameter; S.E. = standard errors. The sample included covers an age 
range of 20-75 years. More complicated models involving age polynomials and its interaction with gender were selected only when the inclusion of the higher order term improved overall 
model fit. Coefficients for age are reported from the final selected model. N =134 observations were deleted due to missingness. 
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Table 3 
Intercorrelations of Self-Reported Domain-Specific Risk Propensity  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. All correlations were significant at p < .05.  
 
 General Driving Financial Recreational Occupational  Health 
Driving .52      
Financial .45 .48     
Recreational .61 .51 .44    
Occupational .61 .46 .48 .57   
Health .43 .54 .43 .47 .40  
Social .47 .41 .42 .45 .46 .35 
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Table 4 
Regression Models Describing the Effect of Chronological Age, Sex, Risk Perception, Expected Benefit and Control Belief on Self-Reported Risk Propensity  
 
Note. Age was mean-centered at the sample mean of 49.5 years; sex was dummy-coded (1 = female, 0 = male). Par. = Parameter; S.E. = standard errors. The sample included covers an age 
range of 20-75 years. More complicated models involving age polynomials and its interaction with gender were selected only when the inclusion of the higher order term improved overall 
model fit. Coefficients for age are reported from the final selected model. N = 134 observations were deleted due to missingness. 
  
 Driving  
(N = 1,786) 
Financial  
(N = 1,786) 
Recreational 
 (N = 1,786) 
Occupational 
 (N = 1,786) 
Health 
(N = 1,786) 
Social 
(N = 1,786) 
Effect Par. S.E. p Par. S.E. p Par. S.E. p Par. S.E. p Par. S.E. p Par. S.E. p 
Intercept 1.210 .202 <.001 1.223 141 <.001 1.159 174 <.001 .745 .205 <.001 1.340 .177 <.001 1.065 212 <.001 
Age .027 .009 .004 .020 .009 .02 .004 .011 .68 –.0004 .009 .99 .014 .011 .20 .024 .011 .03 
Age2 –.0001 .0006 .86       –.0005 .0006 .37    .0002 .0007 .69 
Sex –.678 .093 <.001 –.353 .088 <.001 –.466 .089 <.001 –.237 .087 .007 –.350 .094 <.001 –.167 .088 .06 
Perception .322 .024 <.001 .157 .016 <.001 .421 .021 <.001 .473 .031 <.001 .385 .020 <.001 .361 .029 <.001 
Age x   Perception –.004 .001 <.001 –.004 .001 <.001 –.003 .001 .02 .0009 .001 .12 –.007 .001 <.001 –.004 .001 .005 
Age2 x  Perception –.00006 .00008 .40       .0002 .00009 .547    –.00003 .00009 .73 
Benefit .399 .026 <.001 .251 .018 <.001 .314 .020 <.001 .309 .028 <.001 .241 .018 <.001 .391 .027 <.001 
Age x   Benefit –.004 .001 .001 –.002 .001 .15 –.002 .001 .04 –.005 .001 <.001 .002 .001 .06 –.002 .001 .13 
Age2 x  Benefit –.0002 .00009 .01       –.0001 .00009 .23    –.000006 .00001 .50 
Control Belief .011 .026 .66 –.001 .014 .95 .026 .020 .18 .039 .025 .12 –.026 .019 .19 –.0005 .026 .85 
Age x   Control Belief –.003 .001 .02 –.002 .0009 .05 –.002 .001 .18 .0000006 .002 .99 –.0001 .001 .28 –.002 .001 .15 
Age2 x  Control Belief .00003 .00008 .73       –.00003 .00007 .66    –.000008 .0001 .92 
AIC 6713  6584 6606  6546  6795 6595 
BIC 6789  6639 6660  6621  6849 6670 
R2 .418  .245 .505  .542  .330 .400 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1. Lifespan trajectory of domain-general risk-taking propensity. Blue line = male, red line = female. Curves are plotted 
on a kernel density plot of the raw data (kernel width used for density estimation on x and y axis is 75). 
  
10
20 30 40 50 60 70
8
6
4
2
Age
Ri
sk
 p
ro
pe
ns
ity
General
DOMAIN-SPECIFIC RISK TAKING ACROSS THE ADULT LIFESPAN 
 
29 
 
Figure 2. Lifespan trajectories of risk-taking propensity, risk perception, expected benefit, and perceived control in disparate 
domains of life obtained from regression models. Blue line = male, red line = female. Dashed line indicates no sex 
differences. Curves are plotted on a kernel density plot of the raw data (kernel width used for density estimation on x and y 
axis is 75). 
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Appendix 
Table A1. Distribution of Sample Age 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Age N % 
20 17 1.0 
21 21 1.2 
22 26 1.5 
23 33 1.8 
24 16 0.9 
25 20 1.1 
26 22 1.2 
27 22 1.2 
28 23 1.3 
29 20 1.1 
30 23 1.3 
31 23 1.3 
32 17 1.0 
33 29 1.6 
34 30 1.7 
35 22 1.2 
36 27 1.5 
37 29 1.6 
38 26 1.5 
39 22 1.2 
40 24 1.3 
41 24 1.3 
42 40 2.2 
43 40 2.2 
44 39 2.2 
45 64 3.6 
46 48 2.7 
47 34 1.9 
48 39 2.2 
49 47 2.6 
50 46 2.6 
51 42 2.4 
52 51 2.9 
53 43 2.4 
54 29 1.6 
55 45 2.5 
56 35 2.0 
57 43 2.4 
58 44 2.5 
59 47 2.6 
60 33 1.8 
61 38 2.1 
62 40 2.2 
63 24 1.3 
64 35 2.0 
65 32 1.8 
66 28 1.6 
67 24 1.3 
68 22 1.2 
69 27 1.5 
70 33 1.8 
71 25 1.4 
72 32 1.8 
73 35 2.0 
74 29 1.6 
75 37 2.1 
Total 1786 100 
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Figure A1. A. Histogram of sample age. B Density plot of sample age. 
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Research Article
How does propensity for risk taking change across the 
life span and around the world? Several lines of evidence 
suggest that propensity for risky behavior increases in 
adolescence, peaks in young adulthood, and declines 
with aging (Dohmen et al., 2011; Mandal & Roe, 2014; 
Quetelet, 1842/2013). One paradigmatic example of this 
progression is the link between age and criminal behav-
ior—one possible manifestation of risk taking that has 
been well documented since the 19th century (Quetelet, 
1842/2013). The relation between age and crime has 
been replicated in different cohorts and cultures, albeit 
with significant variation (Steinberg, 2013; Ulmer & 
Steffensmeier, 2014), but to what extent do cultures vary 
systematically in age-risk progression?
One influential conception of risk taking is that it serves 
a functional role (i.e., an adaptation) that may be biologi-
cally determined (Mishra, 2014; Sih & Del Giudice, 2012; 
Wilson & Daly, 1985). In line with this view, propensity for 
risk taking and associated constructs, such as impulsivity 
and sensation seeking, have been conceptualized as traits 
with strong biological underpinnings (Steinberg, 2008; 
Zuckerman, 2007) that show moderate to high heritability 
(Anokhin, Golosheykin, Grant, & Heath, 2012; Benjamin 
et al., 2012; Bezdjian, Baker, & Tuvblad, 2011) and reliable 
gender differences (Cross, Copping, & Campbell, 2011; 
Cross, Cyrenne, & Brown, 2013).
The view that risk taking serves a functional role is 
best discussed in the context of life-history theory, a 
framework that addresses how organisms allocate time 
and energy to tasks and traits so as to maximize their fit-
ness. This framework focuses particularly on how evolu-
tionary forces shape the timing of life events involved in 
development, growth, and reproduction as a result of 
ecological characteristics (Kaplan & Gangestad, 2005). 
According to life-history theory, even universal adapta-
tions “may be limited by sex, life history stage, or circum-
stance” (Tooby & Cosmides, 1990, p. 393). In other words, 
life-history strategies, such as reproductive strategies, can 
be expected to change as a function of ecological 
circumstances.
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Abstract
Past empirical work suggests that aging is associated with decreases in risk taking. But are such effects universal? Life-
history theory suggests that the link between age and risk taking is a function of specific reproductive strategies that 
can be more or less risky depending on the ecology. We assessed variation in the age-risk curve using World Values 
Survey data from 77 countries (N = 147,118). The results suggest that propensity for risk taking tends to decline across 
the life span in the vast majority of countries. In addition, there is systematic variation among countries: Countries in 
which hardship (e.g., high infant mortality) is higher are characterized by higher levels of risk taking and flatter age-risk 
curves. These findings suggest that hardship may function as a cue to guide life-history strategies. Age-risk relations 
thus cannot be understood without reference to the demands and affordances of the environment.
Keywords
risk taking, adult development, gender differences, cross-cultural differences, open materials
Received 3/11/15; Revision accepted 10/27/15
 Psychological Science OnlineFirst, published on January 7, 2016 as doi:10.1177/0956797615617811
 by guest on January 8, 2016pss.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
2 Mata et al.
Current views suggest that one can frame human 
reproductive strategies along a continuum (Ellis et  al., 
2012): Toward one end, individuals may adopt a slower 
life-history strategy that focuses on avoiding risks and 
producing a few high-quality offspring that are likely to 
survive and reproduce; toward the other end, individuals 
may adopt faster life strategies that consist of taking risks 
in the service of promoting mating opportunities, early 
reproduction, and a greater number of offspring with 
more variable outcomes. These risky strategies may be 
particularly adaptive in harsh environments, in which 
morbidity and mortality are high and individuals have to 
compete fiercely for resources. In contrast, in rich, pre-
dictable environments, a slower reproductive strategy 
could be more appropriate. In other words, the rationale 
is that harsh, unpredictable environments may lead indi-
viduals to gamble on shorter life spans and earlier repro-
duction, given that fitness is likely enhanced by breeding 
early and abundantly rather than wasting resources on 
promoting one’s own (unlikely) survival in such condi-
tions (Ellis et al., 2012; Frankenhuis & de Weerth, 2013). 
There is indeed empirical evidence of the dependency 
between reproductive strategies and the harshness or 
unpredictability of local environments (Belsky, Schlomer, 
& Ellis, 2012; Simpson, Griskevicius, Kuo, Sung, & Collins, 
2012; Wilson & Daly, 1997). Life-history theory also sug-
gests that risky behaviors can be expected to be more 
prevalent among males, who are more likely than females 
to face reproductive competition (Ellis et al., 2012).
In sum, local conditions, such as the availability of 
resources and associated competition, are likely to affect 
individuals’ propensity for risk taking. Ultimately, such 
factors may play a role in determining the shape of the 
age-risk relation, and resource scarcity and hardship may 
lead to longer periods of risk taking across the adult life 
span. In the present study, we tested whether local con-
ditions of hardship could be used to predict cross-cul-
tural variation in risk taking across the life span.
The Present Study
There has been considerable interest in accounting for 
similarities and differences in risk taking between cultures 
and countries (Becker, Dohmen, Enke, & Falk, 2014; Hsee 
& Weber, 1999; Rieger, Wang, & Hens, 2015; Vieider et al., 
2015). However, this past work has not considered the 
extent to which the propensity to take risks is associated 
with age across cultures. We aimed to contribute to this 
effort by investigating the following research questions: Is 
a universal progression of risk propensity associated with 
age, such that risk propensity declines from adulthood to 
old age? Do local characteristics (e.g., exposure to hard-
ship), as well as age and gender differences, account for 
potential differences in risk taking across cultures?
To answer these questions, we analyzed data from the 
World Values Survey (http://www.worldvaluessurvey 
.org), which aims to explore people’s values and beliefs 
around the globe. It consists of a series of nationally rep-
resentative surveys of various countries in which similar 
questionnaires are used, mostly in face-to-face inter-
views. We analyzed data collected in the last two inde-
pendent waves of the survey (World Values Survey 
Association, 2008, 2014), which included one item we 
take to measure propensity for risk taking. Data for this 
item were available for 77 countries (see Fig. 1). In par-
ticular, participants were asked to report their similarity 
to a hypothetical individual: “Adventure and taking risks 
are important to this person; to have an exciting life” (for 
details, see Method). This item stems from Schwartz’s 
(2012) Value Survey, which was designed to tap into a set 
of 10 independent universal values. According to 
Schwartz, this item captures individuals’ need for variety 
and stimulation to maintain an optimal level of activation, 
and relates to feelings of excitement, variety seeking, and 
daringness. We take this item to measure the closely 
linked constructs of propensity for risk taking and sensa-
tion seeking that are empirically and theoretically related. 
For example, sensation seeking has been characterized 
as “a trait defined by the seeking of varied, novel, com-
plex, and intense sensations and experiences, and the 
willingness to take physical, social, legal, and financial 
risks for the sake of such experience” (Zuckerman, 2007, 
p. 27).
Our analytic strategy proceeded in two steps. First, we 
analyzed the link between age and propensity for risk 
taking across the 77 countries. Second, we examined the 
extent to which a measure of exposure to hardship (i.e., 
a composite index capturing economic and social hard-
ship through measures of gross domestic product per 
capita, homicide rate, and income inequality, among oth-
ers) could account for cross-country variation in the pat-
tern of the propensity for risk taking across the life span. 
The rationale for the latter analysis was to test the expec-
tation that countries in which individuals are most 
exposed to hardship are likely to show higher levels of 
risk taking and longer periods of risk taking across the 
adult life span.
Method
Participants and procedure
We used data from the last two independent waves, 
Waves 5 and 6, of the World Values Survey (World Values 
Survey Association, 2008, 2014). We based our analysis 
on a balanced sample that consisted of respondents with 
valid answers on the risk item as well as all covariates of 
interest. Our final sample comprised 147,118 individuals 
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(76,617 females, 52%; age range = 15–99 years). The 
countries included in the analysis cover the full range of 
global variation, from very poor to very rich countries, in 
all of the world’s major cultural zones.
Measures
Propensity for risk taking and demographic 
covariates. Each respondent in the World Values Sur-
vey (World Values Survey Association, 2008, 2014) heard 
the following information:
Now I will briefly describe some people. Using this 
card, would you please indicate for each description 
whether that person is very much like you, like you, 
somewhat like you, a little like you, not like you, or 
not at all like you?
Respondents were then asked to rate a number of state-
ments, including the following statement about adven-
ture, excitement, and risk taking: “Adventure and taking 
risks are important to this person; to have an exciting 
life.” Respondents rated the statements using a 6-point 
scale (1 = very much like me, 6 = not at all like me).
In our analyses, we reversed the scale of the item such 
that the highest value (6) represented the highest pro-
pensity for risk taking and the lowest value (1) repre-
sented the lowest propensity for risk taking. We also 
considered a number of demographic variables from the 
survey, including age and gender, education, marital sta-
tus, parental status, and current occupational status. 
These variables represent (a) important indicators of 
human capital and (b) life-cycle phases that have been 
hypothesized to influence risk taking (Dohmen et  al., 
2011; Wilson & Daly, 1985).
Hardship index. To capture exposure to hardship in 
each country, we considered a number of indicators that 
could plausibly capture adversity and economic and 
social strife: homicide rate, gross domestic product, 
income inequality, infant mortality, life expectancy at 
birth, and gender equality (as indexed by the ratio of 
males to females receiving primary education). We man-
ually compiled data concerning these indicators from the 
World Health Organization (homicide rate; World Health 
Organization, 2015), the World Bank (gender equality; 
World Bank, 2015), and the U.S. Central Intelligence 
Agency (gross domestic product, income inequality, 
infant mortality, life expectancy at birth; U.S. Central 
Intelligence Agency, 2015). By and large, the single indi-
cators were significantly correlated. To obtain a single 
index representing exposure to hardship in each country, 
we z-standardized all of the indicators and used appro-
priate transformations (i.e., log transform); some of the 
indicators required reverse coding. Each indicator had 
missing data; the number of countries with missing data 
Countries With 
Available Data
Countries Without
Available Data
Fig. 1. World map showing countries for which data on the measure of propensity for risk taking were available from 
the World Values Survey.
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ranged from one (1% of the sample) to nine (12% of the 
sample). We imputed the missing values with the median 
of each indicator so that we could use all countries and 
indicators in our analyses. Overall, the standardized and 
transformed hardship indicators were reasonably consis-
tent, Cronbach’s α = .86. Consequently, we obtained a 
single hardship index by averaging all six z-standardized 
and transformed indicators. The specific data sources, as 
well as our procedure and the intercorrelations among 
indicators, are described in detail in the Supplemental 
Tables and Figures in the Supplemental Material available 
online.
Statistical analysis
We opted to use a linear regression approach to model 
the dependent variable, propensity for risk taking. First, 
however, we normalized it to have a mean of 50 and a 
standard deviation of 10 (i.e., T score), which is a com-
mon approach when using single, ordinal variables in 
linear regression models (Stevenson & Wolfers, 2008). 
Note, however, that the results were identical for the lin-
ear regression and the ordinal logistic regression, but the 
latter are less straightforward to depict and interpret (see 
Supplemental Tables and Figures).
We estimated the effects of different independent vari-
ables on the risk measure using mixed-effects linear 
regression in R (R Development Core Team, 2013). 
Specifically, we used the function lmer in the lme4 pack-
age (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2014), and we 
obtained p values for each effect on the basis of 
Satterthwaite’s approximation using the package lmerTest 
(Kuznetsova, Brockhoff, & Christensen, 2015). Note that 
our modeling approach was particularly suited to our 
research question because it considered fixed effects 
(i.e., across country, average) of age and gender but also 
random effects (i.e., country specific) of these factors. 
This approach permitted us to assess the effect of eco-
logical (i.e., country) characteristics on age and gender 
differences in propensity for risk taking and to control for 
other potentially relevant demographic covariates, such 
as marital status and education.
We report models estimating linear effects of age and 
gender but no age-by-gender interactions because mod-
els including covariates as well as quadratic effects of age 
or interactions with gender (or both) failed to converge. 
This finding suggests that the models that included inter-
actions do not provide an appropriate description of the 
data. In all our analyses, we used age as a continuous 
variable and binary or dichotomized predictors to sim-
plify coefficient estimation and interpretation, leading to 
the following additional predictors: gender (0 = female, 
1 = male), marital status (0 = not married, 1 = married), 
parental status (0 = no children, 1 = children), education 
(0 = no or incomplete primary education, 1 = primary 
education or higher), and occupational status (0 = not 
currently employed, 1 = currently employed). We com-
pared different regression models using log-likelihood 
tests.
Results
We conducted a number of mixed-effects regression 
models with propensity for risk taking as the dependent 
variable. Table 1 presents the fixed-effects coefficients of 
all relevant models. We first compared a baseline model 
that did not consider any predictors (intercept-only 
model; not shown) with Model 1, which included age 
and gender as predictors. The significantly better fit of 
Model 1 relative to baseline suggests that age and gender 
are important predictors that contribute to explaining a 
Table 1. Estimated Fixed-Effects Coefficients From the Mixed-
Effects Regression Models of Propensity for Risk Taking Across 
the 77 Countries
Model and predictor b SE
T 
score
p 
value
Model 1: Age + gender  
Intercept 51.46 0.29 174.99 < .001
Age –1.98 0.11 –18.15 < .001
Gender –2.33 0.12 –20.10 < .001
Model 2: Age + gender + 
demographic covariates
 
Intercept 52.09 0.27 192.40 < .001
Age –1.43 0.09 –16.19 < .001
Gender –2.17 0.12 –17.82 < .001
Parental status –1.32 0.13 –10.27 < .001
Marital status –0.85 0.10 –8.59 < .001
Occupational status 0.16 0.08 2.06 .04
Education 0.79 0.12 6.66 < .001
Model 3: Age + gender + 
demographic covariates + 
hardship
 
Intercept 52.10 0.26 198.17 < .001
Age –1.42 0.07 –19.22 < .001
Gender –2.16 0.11 –18.83 < .001
Parental status –1.32 0.13 –10.29 < .001
Marital status –0.85 0.10 –8.70 < .001
Occupational status 0.16 0.08 2.02 .05
Education 0.79 0.12 6.83 < .001
Hardship 0.67 0.33 2.04 .04
Hardship × Age 0.48 0.10 4.97 < .001
Hardship × Gender 0.29 0.14 2.03 .05
Note: Variables were coded as follows—gender: 0 = male, 1 = female; 
parental status: 0 = no children, 1 = children; marital status: 0 = 
unmarried, 1 = married; occupational status: 0 = unemployed, 1 = 
employed; and education: 0 = no or incomplete primary education, 
1 = primary education or higher.
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significant amount of variance in propensity for risk tak-
ing, χ2(7, N = 147,118) = 9,293, p < .001. Table 1 shows 
that propensity for risk taking tended to decrease as a 
function of age and was lower for females than for males. 
We also ran Model 2, which included additional covari-
ates of interest (i.e., education, parental status, marital 
status, and occupational status). Model 2 provided a sig-
nificant improvement in fit relative to Model 1, χ2(26, N = 
147,118) = 1,524, p < .001, but the results in Table 2 show 
that the main effects of age and gender remained after 
the inclusion of the additional demographic predictors.
But to what extent are life-span reductions in propen-
sity for risk taking universal? Figure 2 plots the aggregate 
results as well as the country-specific effects of age and 
gender as estimated from Model 2. The pattern of reduc-
tion in propensity for risk taking across the life span, as 
well as the increased propensity for risk taking of males 
relative to females, was replicated in the vast majority of 
countries.
Despite the commonalities across countries, Figure 2 
also highlights considerable variance in propensity for 
risk taking; it steeply declined with age in most countries 
but there are exceptions, such as Nigeria or Mali. As 
expected from the predictions of life-history theory, vari-
ation between countries in propensity for risk taking was 
associated with local characteristics as captured by our 
hardship index. Model 3, which included the hardship 
index as a covariate as well as interactions of hardship 
with age and gender, provided an additional improve-
ment in fit relative to Model 2, χ2(3, N = 147,118) = 
124,283, p < .001. Moreover, the results suggest that hard-
ship was related to intercept differences in propensity for 
risk taking, as well as the age and gender effects identi-
fied in the previous models.
The substantive interpretation of the hardship effects 
is better captured in Figure 3, which depicts the relation 
between the random coefficients for each country (i.e., 
intercepts, age, gender) from the model without hardship 
as a predictor (Model 2). Figure 3 presents the zero-order 
correlations between the model coefficients for each 
country and the hardship index. The hardship index was 
significantly correlated to the intercept of propensity for 
risk taking in each country, r = .24, p < .03, as well as 
with the age coefficients, r = .56, p < .001, and gender 
coefficients, r = .40, p < .001. For example, Figure 3 
shows that the higher the hardship experienced in each 
country, the closer the age coefficient was to 0, which 
represents a flat propensity-for-risk-taking curve across 
the adult life span.
In summary, we found that harsher environments 
were associated with increased propensity for risk taking 
in young adults, smaller gender differences, and smaller 
differences in propensity for risk taking between younger 
and older individuals (i.e., a flattening of the age-risk 
curve). Overall, this finding suggests that ecologically 
dire circumstances may reduce differences in propensity 
for risk taking between younger and older individuals.
Discussion
We analyzed data from a large-scale survey of 77 coun-
tries to test whether the typical age-risk progression, 
which peaks in young adulthood and declines with 
increased age, represents a pancultural regularity. We 
found that the overwhelming majority of countries show 
the typical age-risk pattern, but there is significant varia-
tion in the relation between age and propensity for risk 
taking. Crucially, we found that an index of hardship in 
each country is significantly associated with the shape of 
the age-risk function: Hardship is associated with flatter 
age-risk curves and thus with smaller differences between 
younger and older age groups and between males and 
females. In other words, ecologies with scarce resources 
and therefore heightened competition may lead to 
increased propensity for risk taking regardless of age and 
gender. Our work matches expectations from life-history 
theory that associate ecological characteristics with life-
span development of traits and reproductive strategies 
(Ellis et al., 2012; Mishra, 2014; Wilson & Daly, 1985).
Our work has connections to the broader debate 
about universals in life-span personality development; 
exploration and risk taking may represent important fac-
ets of such development. Whereas some researchers 
emphasize universals (McCrae et  al., 2000), others 
emphasize the importance of normative as well as idio-
syncratic life events in shaping personality; these events 
are likely to vary across cultures and individuals (Roberts, 
Wood, & Smith, 2005). Previous research indicates that 
there are indeed reliable age differences in personality 
development, such as decreases in openness to new 
experiences or increases in conscientiousness with 
increasing age, that have been replicated across samples 
and cultures (Roberts, Walton, & Viechtbauer, 2006). 
Nevertheless, considerable variation in personality devel-
opment across cultures is explained by differences in 
timing of normative life events (Bleidorn et al., 2013). For 
example, Bleidorn et  al. showed that cultures with an 
earlier onset of adult-role responsibilities, such as starting 
employment and parenting, were marked by relatively 
early personality maturation. Our results, which demon-
strate a default progression of propensity for risk taking 
modified by ecological circumstances, are in line with the 
findings of Bleidorn et al. and with associated theories 
positing that personality development is a product, at 
least in part, of experience with the characteristics of 
local ecologies. Viewed more generally, our work con-
tributes to understanding the causes underlying cultural 
variation (Weber & Hsee, 1999) and resonates with calls 
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Fig. 2. (continued on next page)
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Fig. 2. Density plots of propensity for risk taking as a function of age for all countries combined and for each country sepa-
rately. The blue background represents the response density; darker colors represent higher densities. Solid lines and dashed 
lines represent the estimated patterns of propensity for risk taking among males and females, respectively.
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for the use of diverse samples and cohorts (Henrich, 
Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010).
There are a number of limitations associated with the 
data we report. First, the item “adventure and taking risks 
are important to this person; to have an exciting life” 
likely reflects a number of constructs, including propen-
sity for risk taking, sensation seeking, and impulsivity, 
which are related but not necessarily identical 
(Zuckerman, 2007). Research on such constructs suggests 
that each involves distinct components that may merit 
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Fig. 3. Scatterplots (with best-fitting regression lines) of the relations between the hardship index and the country-specific (a) intercepts, (b) 
age-effect estimates, and (c) gender-effect estimates obtained from the mixed-effects regression model in which age and gender (but not hard-
ship) were used to predict risk taking (Model 2). Values on the y-axes in (b) and (c) represent deviations from the mean estimate of the effects 
of age and gender, respectively. See Table 2 for explanations of the country codes.
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individual investigation (Cross et  al., 2013; Mata, Josef, 
Samanez-Larkin, & Hertwig, 2011; Sharma, Markon, & 
Clark, 2014). Future work may consider other, more spe-
cific measures than these that disentangle potential sub-
components of these traits to examine any differential 
life-span courses between them.
Second, we relied solely on a self-report measure, 
which may capture current as well as retrospective 
reports of risk taking and thus cannot assess whether 
similar patterns would be observed for behavioral mea-
sures of risk taking. Past work suggests that there is a 
correlation, albeit small, between self-reported propen-
sity for risk taking and behavior in economic tasks 
(Dohmen et al., 2011; Lauriola, Panno, Levin, & Lejuez, 
2013; Mishra & Lalumière, 2011). However, the pattern of 
age differences in behavioral measures of risk is consid-
erably heterogeneous; only a few tasks suggest a decline 
in propensity for risk taking with increased age (Mata 
et al., 2011). In future work, researchers will need to sys-
tematically assess the link between self-report and behav-
ioral measures of propensity for risk taking and do so 
across cultures (Rieger & Mata, 2013). Finally, a third limi-
tation of the data is that the meaning of adventure, risk, 
and excitement is likely to differ between cultures, ren-
dering direct comparisons between countries challeng-
ing. Future research may want to relate cultural differences 
in the perceptions of risk behavior to age differences in 
propensity for risk taking.
Our work also raises some questions. The monotonic 
age-related decline in risk taking that we found may not 
immediately follow from a life-history framework: If risk 
taking reflects the expected future trajectory of fitness 
prospects, life-history theory leads to the prediction that 
very old individuals with increased risk of morbidity and 
mortality could be more willing to take risks in the hope 
of immediate successful reproductive efforts, which 
would lead to a peak in propensity for risk taking in old 
age (Daly & Wilson, 2005). Some researchers have sug-
gested that the monotonic reduction in risk taking across 
the adult life span could be explained by the possibility 
of resource transfers from older adults (i.e., individuals 
with lower reproductive value) to their offspring with 
higher reproductive value (Rogers, 1994). Future work 
that tracks the risk patterns of older individuals in combi-
nation with resource transfer behavior and goals could 
perhaps test this possibility.
In conclusion, age is associated with reduced propen-
sity for risk taking in a quasi-universal fashion. 
Nevertheless, the considerable variation in the link 
between age and propensity for risk taking is systemati-
cally associated with local hardship. Specifically, high-
risk ecologies favor reproductive strategies associated 
with increased risk taking across the life span and a flat-
tening of the age-risk curve. Age-risk relations appear to 
reflect, among other factors, individuals’ adjustment to 
the characteristics of local ecologies and cannot be 
understood without reference to the demands and afford-
ances of the environment.
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Abstract 
Sometimes, cognitive aging coincides with decrements in decision performance. The 
determinants of the existence and magnitude of such age differences, however, are little 
understood. Based on effects of task complexity, we hypothesized that decrements in older 
adults’ performance may depend on the degree to which decisions tax memory capacities. In 
two studies, younger (18–30 years of age) and older adults (>65 years) made decisions with 
high or low demands on memory. In a personnel-selection scenario, participants decided 
which candidate would be best suited for a job. To this end, they had to retrieve from 
memory either all (high demand) or a subset (low demand) of information. Older adults’ 
decisions, relative to those of younger adults, were most compromised when demands on 
memory were high. Individual differences in memory ability mediated the relationship 
between age, memory demand, and decision performance. Modeling of the strategies 
underlying decisions suggests that younger adults balance the high demand on memory by 
switching to a simpler noncompensatory strategy. Older adults do not seem to compensate 
but instead their use of idiosyncratic strategies rises. The findings suggests that one of the 
pathways through which memory demands produce age-dependent effects on decision 
performance is through the triggering of different decision making strategies. Younger 
adults appear more able to balance increasing memory demands by simpler strategies, an 
adaptive response less available to older adults. 
Max: 250; Actual: 226 
Keywords: aging, decision making, memory demand, strategy selection  !  
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How Cognitive Aging Affects Decision Making When Memory Demands Rise  
Aging is associated with reductions in fluid cognitive abilities. This can have 
implications for many everyday behaviors, including making decisions (Tymula, Rosenberg 
Belmaker, Ruderman, Glimcher, & Levy, 2013). Specifically, studies have observed lower 
decision performance of older relative to younger adults (e.g. Bruine de Bruin, Parker, & 
Fischhoff, 2010; Finucane, Mertz, Slovic, & Schmidt, 2005; Henninger, Madden, & Huettel, 
2010; Mata & Nunes, 2010; Yoon, Cole, & Lee, 2009). Yet, such age differences are not 
observed across the board. In some studies older adults’ decisions match those of younger 
adults (e.g., Frey, Mata, & Hertwig, 2015; Hosseini et al., 2010; Li, Gao, Enkavi, Zaval, 
Weber, & Johnson, 2015). We propose that the diversity in results are a function of a 
studies’ different task demands, and in particular the demands on memory abilities (Bruine 
de Bruin et al., 2010; Del Missier et al., 2013). The missing link, however, is how memory 
demands translate into decision performance. To shed light on this link, we investigate and 
model how a task captivates memory abilities and steers the selection of decision strategies. 
Accounting for this process offers a window onto the effects of aging on decision making 
and, more generally, a window on the selection and use of specific decision strategies in 
younger and older adults in general. 
The aging literature has since long found support for task complexity effects that is, 
the notion that characteristics of the task in question moderate the effects of aging (e.g. 
Cerella, Poon, & Williams, 1980; Clay, 1954). However, task complexity per se does not 
suffice to predict effects of cognitive aging on decision performance. In addition, one needs 
to theorize how the properties of a task environment lead older adults to perform as well, 
better or worse than younger adults. There are, of course, a number of candidate pathways. 
First, the requirements implied by the task at hand can be more or less taxing on older 
adults’ declining fluid abilities, such as when options’ values have to be extracted and 
learned from probabilistic feedback (Henninger et al., 2010) or when many pieces of 
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information are presented (Finucane et al., 2005; Mata & Nunes, 2010). Second, the 
decision maker can offset these high demands on processing resources (e.g., memory, 
processing speed) by enlisting simpler strategies that put less strain on already taxed 
resources than more complex strategies. Third, older adults with declining processing 
resources (but also those younger adults endowed with fewer resources) will more likely 
adjust their employed strategy when task demand is high. Fourth, this age- and resources-
dependent compensatory use of simpler strategies can exact age differences in the quality of 
decisions (Henninger et al., 2010; Mata, Schooler, & Rieskamp, 2007).  
To date, no study has directly tested the effects of memory demand, or, retrieval 
effort, on strategy selection and adult age differences in decision making. We here aim to fill 
this gap. We examine to what extent varying task demands in terms of the mnemonic 
retrieval of information can result in the selection of different strategies, and, eventually, in 
adult age differences in decision making. Next, we first briefly review the literature on 
memory and aging. Then, we provide a summary of past work on decision making and 
aging. Finally, we give an overview of our two studies that link these two largely 
unconnected lines of research.  
Memory and Aging 
Aging is associated with sizeable decline in declarative components of long-term and 
working memory (Bäckman, Small, & Wahlin, 2001; Fleischmann, Wilson, Garbrieli, 
Bienieas, & Bennett, 2004; Hedden & Gabrieli, 2004; Old & Naveh-Benjamin, 2008). Age 
differences in memory performance are likely to be moderated by the degree of self-initiated 
processing, that is, the retrieval depending on self-generated cues and control processes in 
memory (Craik, Routh, & Broadbent, 1983; La Voie & Light, 1994; Old & Naveh-
Benjamin, 2008). This maps onto a view about the aging of memory that attributes age-
related recall and learning deficits to at least two components: aging impacts, first, the 
strategic manipulation of information (Bouazzaoui et al., 2010; Insingrini, Angel, Fay, 
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Taconnat, Lemaire, & Bouazzaoui, 2015; Sander, Lindenberger, & Werkle-Bergner, 2012), 
and, second, the basic encoding and storage of information in terms of a bound 
representation (i.e., a memory representation composed of the qualities of several pieces of 
information; Naveh-Benjamin, 2000; Shing, Werkle-Bergner, Li, & Lindenberger, 2008). 
Whereas strategic processes are localized in frontal brain areas, the associative binding 
components are more posterior (i.e., parietal, temporal). During memory retrieval posterior 
activations are controlled by the prefrontal cortex (e.g., Badre & Wagner, 2007; Buckner, 
2004). This dovetails nicely with research showing that older adults engage in memory-
demanding strategic processes (e.g. retrieval-strategies) less often and less efficiently than 
younger adults (Touron, 2015). This effect seems to be moderated by the relative effort of 
retrieval strategies: Older adults use retrieval strategies less often when the amount of 
information to be recalled is large relative to when it is smaller (Touron & Hertzog, 2004a; 
Touron & Hertzog, 2004b). Yet, there is still debate on the extent to which failures in 
strategic processes evidence in, for instance, higher error rates during the execution of 
memory strategies, can account for age differences in several aspects of memory functioning 
(Dunlosky & Hertzog, 1998; Hertzog & Dunlosky, 2004). For example, older and younger 
adults can show the same memory performance, but older adults are still less likely to use 
memory strategies throughout a task (Touron & Hertzog, 2004b). When memory demand is 
lower because a task provides retrieval cues, age-related deficits in memory performance 
decrease or disappear altogether (Lindenberger & Mayr, 2014).  
Decision Making and Cognitive Aging 
Decision strategies differ in their informational and computational demands, and, by 
extension, their cognitive demands (Marewski & Schooler, 2011; Shah & Oppenheimer, 
2008). Consider, for instance, the decision of which of two job candidates is better qualified 
for a job (the criterion). Lacking direct knowledge of candidates’ criterion value, one must 
employ predictive information (cues, that is, variables that correlate, albeit imperfectly, with 
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the criterion variable in a decision problem). For example, cues associated with a 
candidates’ qualities could be experience on the job or how socially competent he or she is.  
Models of decision strategies differ in how they process cues. Compensatory 
decision strategies use all available cues and typically process them in sophisticated ways. 
For instance, the weighted additive strategy (WADD; Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993) 
weighs each cue according to a measure of cue goodness called validity, adds up the thus 
weighted cues and chooses the option with the higher weighted sum of cue values. Tallying, 
albeit a compensatory strategy dispenses with weighting and simply adds binary (or 
dichotomized positive and negative) cue values and chooses the option with the higher sum 
of cue values (Dawes, 1979). Noncompensatory strategies simplify processing of cues in 
various ways. Take-the-best (TTB; Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996), for instance, orders cues 
by their validity and looks them up one at a time. As soon as a discriminating cue is found, 
search is stopped and a decision is made on the basis of that cue alone. Other strategies 
simplify the processing even further, for instance, by dispensing with any ordering of cues. 
What determines which strategy people select in a given decision situation? The 
concept of ecological rationality suggests that decision strategies are adapted to particular 
environments. Competent decision makers adaptively select the decision strategy that 
matches the given decision situation and their cognitive resources (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 
1996). As stated earlier, decision strategies differ in their level of effort needed to use them. 
Compensatory decision strategies are more effortful than noncompensatory ones because 
they require more exhaustive information search, time spent on the problem, and more 
complex computations. This is particularly the case when the information, entered into the 
decision strategies, has to be retrieved from memory (Bröder & Schiffer, 2003b; 2006). Past 
work has shown that when cognitive capacities are limited or when costs of information 
search are high (young) adults have been shown to be more likely to enlist simpler 
strategies. Such a shift is generally explained by an effort-accuracy tradeoff (Beach & 
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Mitchell, 1978). Individuals weigh the costs of using a strategy (i.e. the cognitive effort) 
against its benefits (i.e. decision accuracy) when choosing among strategies. Increased 
reliance on simple decision strategies, in turn, has been related to individual differences in 
fluid abilities, such as working memory (Horn, Pachur, & Mata, 2015; Mata et al. 2007; 
Pachur, Mata, & Schooler, 2009). 
As highlight above, memory and the waning of its power with age is one key to 
understand older people’s cognition. Past research has shown that performance decreases in 
older adults are associated with the selection of simpler decision strategies that may not be 
appropriate to the decision situation at hand (Mata, Pachur, von Helversen, Hertwig, 
Rieskamp, & Schooler, 2012; Mata et al., 2007). Therefore, one may suspect that older 
people—akin to younger people whose cognitive resources are taxed—transition to the use 
of simpler, cognitively less demanding strategies. This strategy shift, in turn, may explain 
age differences in accuracy when decision making requires extensive information search in 
memory. 
Overview of the Studies 
In two experiments, we investigated the role of memory demands on the emergence 
of age differences in decision performance and strategy selection. Participants memorized 
cue information about several options in question. They then made decisions in a context in 
which retrieval or consideration of all information was necessary for high decision accuracy. 
To vary memory demands, decisions were based on information retrieval from memory 
(high memory demand, HD) or on information displayed in front of the decision maker (low 
memory demand, LD). We tested the following hypotheses: 
(1) Older adults’ decisions reach a lower level of accuracy than younger adults and 
the former relied more on simpler strategies than the latter. Both effects occur most strongly 
when demands on memory are high and when decision making demands a high degree of 
self-initiated processing.  
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(2) Individuals’ differential memory is key in the occurrence of individual and age 
differences in performance when tasks strongly call upon memory. 
Both experiments simulated a personnel selection task, involving a set of job 
candidates. Participants initially learnt pertinent information about the candidates, and then 
aimed to decide, facing pairs of candidates, which one was best qualified for a given job (for 
a similar design, see Bröder & Schiffer, 2003b). Since both experiments adopted the same 
design, except in the initial learning criterion (explained shortly), we describe their methods 
and results side by side. 
Methods 
Experimental Design and Procedure 
Both experiments began with a learning phase. Participants memorized relevant 
information about the job candidates and the quality of the information. Then, each 
participant faced two decision tasks varying in memory demand. Between the two tasks, 
participants were asked to recall the information they had learned. Finally, participants 
received feedback regarding their recall and decision performances. Finally, each individual 
completed a battery of cognitive tasks (see Table 1) including, in this order, a vocabulary 
test (MWT-B; Lehrl, 1999), a processing-speed measure (Digit-Symbol-Substitution Test; 
Wechsler, 1981), a paired-recall task (long term memory; Shing et al., 2008), and a working 
memory task (automated operation span; Unsworth, Heitz, Schrock, & Engle, 2005). 
Overall, the experiment used a mixed factorial design, with age group (younger 
adults vs. older adults) as a between-subjects factor and memory demand in the decision task 
(high vs. low) as a within-subjects factor (see Figures 1 and 2). 
Learning phase. After being introduced to the simulated personnel-selection 
scenario, participants learnt information about five female job candidates. Specifically, they 
were trained on information about cue values, the cue ordering and the direction of cues (see 
Figure 1). 
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First, participants memorized candidates’ values (binary values) on five different 
cues: social competence, work experience, knowledge of foreign languages, foreign 
experience, and specialty. In total, 25 cue values were presented. Learning proceeded as 
follows: Participants studied a table of all 25 cue values for three minutes (presented along 
side of portraits of the candidates and their first names; Figure 1A). Subsequently, the 
portrait of a candidate was presented and participants reproduced his or her cue values (in 
any order; Figure 1B). Immediate feedback was given after each response. Then the next 
portrait was presented. To make sure that older and younger adults’ knowledge about the 
cue values was similarly extensive, participants could only move forward once they reached 
a learning criterion, namely, the correct recall of 21 (84%; Experiment 1) and 23 (92%; 
Experiment 2) of the 25 cue values. The learning procedure was repeated (with a shortened 
1-minute presentation of the cue value table) until these criteria were reached. 
The next step consisted in learning the ranking of the cues (i.e., how important is the 
cue in selecting a person for the job). Learning began with all cues being presented (Figure 
1C), and participants indicated their ranking (in the first round by guessing). The correct 
ranking was then presented on the right side of the screen after each trial. The learning 
criterion was the ability to correctly reproduce the cue ranking two times (Experiment 1) or 
four times (Experiment 2) consecutively. 
Finally, participants learnt the directions of the cues, that is, the direction of the 
association between cues and criterion (i.e., which of the cue values are associated with the 
higher values on the criterion). For each trial, the cue name (e.g., knowledge of foreign 
language), and its two possible values (e.g., Dutch or Polish) were presented and participants 
indicate which value indicates higher quality (initially by guessing) (Figure 1D). The 
learning criterion was the ability to correctly reproduce all cue directions two (Experiment 
1) or four times (Experiment 2) consecutively. 
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Decision tasks. In two different response scenarios, participants decided which of 
two job candidates is better qualified for the job (Figure 2). First, only the portraits and 
names of two candidates were presented on the screen and all cue information had to be 
retrieved from memory. This represented a high-memory-demand (HD) decision (Figure 
2A). Second, the two candidates’ cue values were presented, with cues ordered according to 
their ranking. Here the decision maker had to merely retrieve the direction of each cue from 
memory. This represented the low-memory-demand (LD) decision (Figure 2B). In both 
decisions, the candidates’ cue value information was identical but different portraits and 
names of the candidates were used. Thus, the performance in both decisions could be 
compared. 
Participants were instructed that out of the two candidates per decision the one with 
the higher number of cue values positively associated with the criterion is the one with better 
qualification. With this instruction, we determined tallying as the strategy to reach a correct 
decision (see Appendix Table A1 and A2 for object descriptions and choice predictions). In 
order to enable participants to employ tallying, they were instructed and incentivized to 
remember as much information as possible. With five job candidates, a total of ten 
(nobjects*(nobjects-1)/2) distinct paired comparisons were possible. Because each pair was 
presented twice, we arrived at 20 HD and 20 LD decisions.  
Recall Test. After the HD decision, participants completed a recall test in which they 
were asked to retrieve their knowledge of all cue values of each candidate, the cue ordering 
and directions). No feedback was given.  
Participants 
A total of 80 and 103 participants took part in Experiment 1 and 2: forty younger 
(ages 18–30 years, M = 22.0, SD = 3.5, 57.5% female) and forty older participants (64–79 
years, M = 69.9, SD = 3.8, 57.5% female) in Experiment 1, and fifty-three younger (ages 
18–30 years, M = 22.5, SD = 3.4, 50% female) and fifty older adults (64–80 years, M = 68.7, 
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SD = 3.2, 50% female) in Experiment 2. Younger and older participants were matched in 
terms of the number of years of formal education and gender (for a detailed description of 
participant characteristics, see Table 1). In Experiment 1, the majority of young adults were 
students from the University of Basel. Older adults came from the Basel community, 
recruited via newspaper ads and flyers. In Experiment 2, young and older adults were 
residents from Berlin, recruited via local newspaper ads. In Experiment 1, young and older 
participants took about 1–1.5h and 2.5–3.0h, respectively, to complete all tasks. In 
Experiment 2, the learning criteria were stricter (see learning phase). As a consequence, 
60% of the older adults needed a second learning session to meet the criterion. This 
additional session always took place one day after the first session. In total, younger adults 
needed on average 2.3 and 8.9 learning trials (i.e. where one trial equals recall of the cue 
information of all five candidates) to reach the learning criterion in Experiments 1 and 2, 
respectively. Older adults, by contrast, needed on average 13.3 and 34.7 learning trials in 
Experiments 1 and 2, respectively. Experiment 2’s stricter criteria made the learning phase 
became more challenging. In Experiments 1 and 2, ten (20%) and eight (14%) older 
participants did not reach the learning criterion and were omitted from the study. All 
participants received a show-up fee (Experiment 1: 10 CHF per hour; Experiment 2: 7.50 
EUR per hour) plus a performance-contingent bonus for each correct decision in the HMD 
and LMD decisions (Experiment 1: 0.20 CHF; Experiment 2: 0.50 EUR). 
Results 
The effects of age and memory demand on decision performance were analyzed 
using a mixed-effects ANOVA model. Furthermore, to test for the effect of memory and 
recall ability on performance, we combined these variables in a mediation model. The 
ANOVA was implemented using the afex (Singmann et al, 2015), the mediation model was 
conducted using the lavaan (Rosseel et al., 2014) package for R (R Core Team, 2013). 
Finally, we classified participants as users of either a compensatory or noncompensatory 
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decision strategy (e.g., TALLY/WADD vs. TTB) in the HD and LD decisions. The strategy 
classification was based on a multinomial processing tree (MPT) approach, implemented 
within a Bayesian framework (Hilbig & Moshagen, 2014; Riefer & Batchfelder, 1988; see 
also Lee, 2015). The Bayesian estimation of the MPT models was implemented using JAGS 
(Denwood & Plummer, 2015) and the R package R2jags (Su & Yajima, 2015). 
What is the Effect of Memory Demand on Decision Performance? 
Decision performance was defined as the percentage of correct decisions across all 
trials. Figure 3 shows older and younger adults’ percentages of correct HD and LD decisions 
in both experiments (see Table 2). An ANOVA revealed main effects for age group and 
memory demand on performance. Young adults performed better than older adults 
(Experiment 1: F(1, 78) = 16.44, p < .001, η2p = .17; Experiment 2: F(1, 101) = 7.44, p = 
.008, η2p = .069). Performance was lower in HD decisions relative to LD decisions 
(Experiment 1: F(1, 78) = 71.12, p < .001, η2p = .48; Experiment 2: F(1, 101) = 123.37, p < 
.001, η2p = .55). 
Importantly, high memory demand in the HD decisions had a differential effect on 
performance for the two age groups; specifically, the age difference was larger in HD than 
in LD decisions. This was indicated by an interaction between kinds of decisions and age 
group, Experiment 1: F(1, 78) = 4.99, p = .03, η2p = .06; Experiment 2: F(1, 101) = 4.83, p = 
.03, η2p = .05. The inclusion of individual learning performance, defined as each 
participant’s proportion of correctly recalled cue values in the last learning trial of the cue-
learning phase, did not change these results. This suggests that individual differences in 
knowledge about the cues per se did not drive the age differences in both experiments. But 
what then is behind these differences? 
Is Decision Performance Related to Memory Performance? 
To answer this question, we next analyzed the relationships between decision 
performance and memory performance. The latter was composed of the ability to correctly 
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recall the learned cue information, and in addition, an individual’s general (independent of 
his or her cue-based recall) memory ability. Recall ability was measured both in terms of 
participants’ ability to correctly recall the information acquired in the learning phase (i.e., 
cue values, cue direction, cue ranking); general memory ability was measured through the 
performance in the associative and working memory tasks of the cognitive battery. 
We first computed pairwise correlations between all these variables. Performance in 
the LD decisions correlated with recall of the direction of cues (see Supplemental 
Materials). Relative to older adults, young adults showed perfect recall of cue directions (see 
Table 2). Age differences in the accuracy of LD decisions are thus due to older individuals’ 
less accurate recall of cue directions. Performance in the HD decision task, in contrast, 
correlated with recall of all three types of cue information. Cue recall, in turn, was 
significantly related to general memory ability, with a stronger link between cue recall and 
associative memory relative to working memory. 
Next, we constructed a mediation model and tested whether the effect of age on 
decision performance in the HD decisions was mediated by individual differences in 
memory ability via cue recall. Memory ability was indexed by a composite measure, 
summarizing performance in the operation span and associative recall task. Cue recall was 
indexed by a composite measure, summarizing recall of cue profiles, directions, and 
ranking. Figure 4 depicts the model and the standardized regression coefficients for 
Experiment 1 and 2. The effect of age on decision performance proved to be mediated by 
memory ability via cue recall. The effect of age on memory was significantly negative 
(Experiment 1: b = –0.59, SE = 0.09, p <.001; Experiment 2: b = –0.64, SE = 0.08, p <.001); 
the effect of memory on recall (Experiment 1: b = 0.42, SE = 0.09, p = .001; Experiment 2: 
b = 0.48, SE = .12, p < .001) and recall on decision performance was significantly positive 
(Experiment 1: b = 0.58, SE = 0.17, p <.001; Experiment 2: b = 0.41, SE = 0.09, p <.001). 
The effect of age on recall was negative (Experiment 1: b = –0.32, SE = 0.11, p = .003; 
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Experiment 2: b = –0.20, SE = 0.10, p < .001). Age no longer affected recall performance 
when memory ability was controlled for (Experiment 1: b = –0.04, SE = 0.13, p = .73; 
Experiment 2: b = 0.10, SE = 0.12, p = .38). 
Overall, these results suggest that individuals with better general memory ability 
were better able to recall cue information and therefore performed better in the HD 
decisions. We also ran a model with a direct path from age to accuracy of decisions to test 
for direct effects of age. This model did not yield a significantly better model fit.  
Let us conclude by emphasizing that we do not make any causal inferences about 
age-related mechanisms unfolding over time from the results described above as age 
differences in a cross-sectional sample need not be identical to longitudinal mediations (see 
Lindenberger, von Oertzen, Ghisletta, & Hertzog, 2011). 
How does Memory Demand Affect Strategy Selection? 
Does older adults’ decreased memory performance also impact the decision strategy 
they select and employ? Previous research has shown that also young adults respond to 
increasing cognitive demands by switching to a simpler, noncompensatory strategy such as 
take-the-best (Bröder & Schiffer, 2003b). This heuristic inspects cues by their ranking and 
looks them up one at a time. As soon as a discriminating cue is found, search is stopped and 
a decision is made on the basis of that cue alone (e.g., Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996; for an 
overview, see Pachur & Bröder, 2013). Do older adults also balance the greater demands on 
memory in HD decisions by switching to a simpler strategy that curtails search, such as the 
take-the-best heuristic? Alternatively, do they resort to strategies that, albeit still methodical, 
are more idiosyncratic, and do not fit the traditional framework of compensatory versus 
noncompensatory processing (e.g., people integrate across some but no longer all cues)? Or, 
does older adults’ approach to making decisions simply become erratic, for instance, by 
resorting to guessing instead of executing a methodical strategy? 
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To examine these possibilities, we conducted a classification of each individual's 
strategies via a Bayesian estimation of a multinomial processing tree model. Such a model 
yields the (posterior) probability of an individual's choices predicted by a specific strategy 
(see Lee, 2015 for details). The predictions made by each strategy are probabilistic (Bergert 
& Nosofsky, 2007, Rieskamp, 2008) and permit for erroneous responses with probabilities 
up to .50 (Bröder & Schiffer, 2003a; Hilbig & Moshagen, 2014). In this estimation model, 
we included the weighted additive strategy (WAAD), tallying (TALLY), and take-the-best 
(TTB) strategies described above. The estimation model also included a “guessing” strategy, 
choosing each option with probability .50, and a “non-classified strategy,” imposing no 
constraints whatsoever on choices and their respective probabilities (saturated model). The 
inclusion of the latter “strategy” is important given that it captures all participants that do not 
follow any of the other specified strategies but resort to more idiosyncratic one (see Hilbig 
& Moshagen, 2014). 
Table 3 shows the classification results for both age groups and the HD and LD 
decisions. For young adults the vast majority was classified as following a compensatory 
strategy in both types of decisions (i.e., WADD or TALLY). Yet, the prevalence of 
compensatory processes was lower in the taxing HD relative to the less demanding LD 
decisions (Experiment 1: z = 2.9, p < .01; Experiment 2: z = 2.8, p < .01). Similarly, older 
adults were also more likely to be classified as following a compensatory strategy in LD 
than in HD decisions (Experiment 1: z = 4.0, p < .01, Experiment 2: z = 4.0, p < .01). In the 
HD decisions, the majority of older adults was classified into the saturated model (60% and 
54% of the sample in Experiment 1 and 2), suggesting that with high demands on memory 
their decision making turned more idiosyncratic. 
Discussion 
Across two experiments, we found that the recruitment of memory resources in the 
process of making a decision is a crucial factor that determines decision performance—in 
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younger individuals but especially in older ones. Age differences in accuracy were most 
amplified when individuals made decisions from memory rather than when information was 
displayed in front of the decision maker. These results are consistent with the thesis that age 
differences in task performance rise as a function of increasing complexity of the task to be 
mastered (Cerella et al., 1980). Our results are also in line with research that investigated 
this regularity in tasks as diverse as spatial object recognition (Dobson, Kirasic, & Allen, 
1995), speed of perception and response time (Birren, 1956), mathematical problem solving 
(Clay, 1954), and they also complement previous results involving decision making (e.g., 
Finucane et al., 2005; Queen, Hess, Ennis, Dowd, & Grühn, 2012). One implication from 
this set of findings is that age differences in decision making will not emerge invariably. 
Instead, they come and go as a function of the cognitive demands levied by a task, and 
among those memory demands are likely to be particularly significant.  
Our results resonate with findings from the literature on aging and memory. Age 
effects are more pronounced in tasks requiring the deliberative recollection of information 
and a high degree of self-initiated processing. We found that individual differences in 
memory ability mediate the effect of age on performance when decisions invoked high 
demand on an individual’s memory. When retrieval cues are provided in the decision 
situation, age differences in performance decrease (e.g. Lindenberger & Mayr, 2014).  
Our findings for strategy selection suggest that one of the pathways through which 
memory demands produce age-dependent effects on decision performance is through the 
triggering of different decision making strategies. One open question concerns the cause 
behind older adults’ highly idiosyncratic decision strategies when memory demand is high 
(see our strategy classification analysis). In theory, several factors could contribute to older 
adults’ switch to more idiosyncratic strategies such as memory errors during recall of cue 
cues, reduced information search, or a combination thereof. Past research found that older 
adults engage in less information search prior to a decision (Mata & Nunes, 2010; Spaniol & 
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Wegier, 2012) and that the curtailing of information search and/or the selection of simpler 
decision strategies is one way to reduce cognitive load during decision making (Bröder, 
2003b). These findings would suggest that older adults may trade-off the utility of more 
information versus with the costs of retrieval when making decisions. Our modeling results 
show that especially older adults resort to strategies that, albeit still methodical, are more 
idiosyncratic, and do not fit the traditional framework of compensatory versus 
noncompensatory processing. That said, they might still integrate across some but no longer 
all cues. Second, older adults may be as good in retrieval processes and quality of recall as 
younger adults but fail during the online integration of those memories into a compound 
value during decision making. This fits research showing that older adults make more errors 
when executing strategies that require extensive integration of information (Bruine de Bruin 
et al., 2007; Mata et al., 2010; Light, 1991). It is also in line with studies reporting age-
related deficiencies in the ability to uphold current task representations in mind which can, 
in turn, be related to impairments in attention, working memory, and executive control 
(Ardid, Wang, & Compte, 2007). In order to distinguish between these alternatives—the 
role of cost-benefit trade-offs versus online retrieval and integration deficits—future 
investigations may capitalize on additional process-tracing methods such as verbal protocols 
(Cokely & Kelley, 2009), tracing methods of information search (Renkewitz & Jahn, 2012; 
Scholz & Helversen, 2015; Pachur, Hertwig, Gigerenzer, & Brandstätter, 2013), or 
neuroimaging studies (Khader, Pachur, Meier, Bien, Jost, & Rösler, 2011). 
Let us not minimize the importance of the results that age differences in decision 
making are much reduced when memory demands are low. This finding resonates with the 
notion of environmental support in task calling upon memory (Lindenberger & Mayer, 
2014) and with the notion of decision aids (Todd & Benbasat, 1994). Age differences in 
memory performance are reduced when environment support in terms of hints, reminders, or 
contextual reinstatement are provided (Bouazzaoui et al., 2010; Craig, 1983). Similarly, 
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decision aids can help individuals to implement strategies by altering the effort required to 
execute it (Cole & Balasubramanian, 1993; Todd & Banbasat, 2000). In the future decision 
scientists and cognitive aging researchers may collaborate in developing decision support 
systems that enable older adults to make good decisions under cognitively (mnemonically) 
challenging circumstances.  
Conclusion  
Memory is a resource in increasingly shorter supply with older age. This limiting 
factor also influences the success of decision making in older age. Across two types of 
decisions, one strongly taxing memory and the other easing demands on memory, we found 
that age differences in performance were greatest when a decision required the self-initiated 
retrieval of cues from memory. Age differences in memory ability, in turn, mediated the age 
differences in decision making. Older and younger individuals were on more equal 
footing—in terms of enlisting compensatory strategies—when relevant cue information, on 
which decisions were to be derived, was represented externally. This suggests that 
environmental support can boost decision making in old age under cognitively challenging 
conditions. Finally, our results suggest that further investigations of how and how well older 
individuals making decisions need to be informed by a task analysis that determines the 
cognitive demands imposed. !  
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Table 1  
Participant Characteristics 
 Younger Adults  Older Adults  Statistical test 
 M SD  M SD  t p d 
Experiment 1           
     N 40  40     
    Agea 22.0 3.5  69.9 3.8  - - - 
    Education (years)a 13.7 3.0  13.3 3.4    –0.72   .47     0.12 
    Vocabulary 0.80 0.08  0.92 0.06    8.13 <.01 –1.70 
    Processing speed 0.68 0.10  0.49 0.10  –8.61 <.01   1.90 
    Paired recall 0.54 0.25  0.24 0.21  –5.87 <.01   1.29 
    Operation span 0.93 0.09  0.84 0.14  –3.08 <.01   0.76 
          
Experiment 2          
    N 53  50     
    Agea 22.5 3.4  68.7 3.2  - - - 
    Education (years)a 15.3 2.7  15.3 2.8  –0.06 .94 0 
    Vocabulary 0.84 0.05  0.89 0.07  4.59 <.01 –0.82 
    Processing speed 0.63 0.11  0.45 0.09  –8.95 <.01 1.79 
    Paired recall 0.49 0.26  0.21 0.17  –6.43 <.01 1.28 
    Operation span 0.82 0.13  0.58 0.21  –7.02 <.01 1.38 
          
 
Note. Vocabulary = Spot-a-Word Test (score range 0–37; Lehrl, 1999), Processing speed = Digit Symbol Substitution (score range 0–93; Wechsler, 
1981). a These measures report raw scores not proportions.  Positive effect sizes indicate worse performance of older adults relative to younger 
adults negative effect sizes worse performance of young relative to older adults.  
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Table 2  
Decision and Recall Performance 
 Younger Adults  Older Adults  Statistical test 
Measure M SD  M SD  t p d 
Experiment 1          
  Low memory demand 0.91 0.09  0.84 0.20  –2.25 <.01 0.45 
  High memory demand 0.77 0.17  0.58 0.23  –4.08 <.01 0.94 
  Cue profiles  0.83 0.16  0.78 0.13  –1.36   0.18 0.34 
  Cue ranking  0.99 0.03  0.83 0.24  –4.52 <.01 0.94 
  Cue directions 1.00 0.00  0.78 0.13  –3.26 <.01 2.39 
Experiment 2          
  Low memory demand 0.88 0.12  0.84 0.16  –1.23 .22 0.28 
  High memory demand 0.70 0.19  0.58 0.21  –3.00 <.01 0.60 
  Cue profiles 0.82 0.14  0.78 0.12  –1.77 0.08 0.31 
  Cue ranking 0.92 0.19  0.86 0.25  –1.38 0.17 0.27 
  Cue directions 0.99 0.05  0.95 0.09  –2.41 0.02 0.55 
 
Note. All of these measures report mean proportions of correctly recalled cues. Positive effect sizes 
indicate worse performance of older adults relative to younger adults negative effect sizes worse 
performance of young relative to older adults. 
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Note. Columns show frequencies as well as the proportion of participants 
out of the whole sample (in brackets) classified to the respective model. 
LD = low memory demand, HD = high memory demand, WADD = 
weighted additive model, TALLY = tallying model, TTB = take-the-best 
model, SAT = saturated model, GUESS = guessing.  
  
Table 3  
Strategy Classification  
 
 Younger Adults   Older Adults   
 LD HD  LD HD  
Experiment 1 n = 40  n = 40  
    WADD 17 (42.5%) 10 (25%)  9 (22.5%) 5 (12.5%)  
    TALLY 22 (55%) 20 (50%)  22 (55%) 8 (20%)   
    TTB – 6 (15%)  1 (2.5%) –  
    GUESS – –  1 (2.5%) 3 (7.5%)  
    SAT 1 (2.5%) 4 (10%)  7 (17.5%) 24 (60%)  
Experiment 2 n = 53  n = 50  
    WADD 21 (39.6%) 11 (20.8%)  11 (22%) 9 (18%)  
    TALLY 23 (43.4%) 20 (37.7%)  26 (52%) 8 (16%)  
    TTB 8 (15.1%) 7 (13.2%)  4 (8%) 3 (6%)  
    GUESS – 2 (3.8%)  2 (4%) 3 (6%)  
    SAT 1 (1.9%) 13 (24.5%)  7 (14%) 27 (54%)  
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Figure 1. Learning phase of Experiment 1 and 2. A = Cue-profile overview, B = Cue-profile 
learning phase, C = Cue-ranking learning phase, D = Cue-direction learning phase.   
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Figure 2. Decision tasks in Experiment 1 and 2. A = High memory demand (HD), B = Low 
memory demand (LD). The cue-recall phase was interspersed between the HD and LD 
decision phase and looked similar to learning phase b–d despite no immediate feedback as 
given.  
  
Figure 05 - Anika Josef
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Figure 3. Mean (%) decision performance for younger and older adults in each decision task 
in Experiment 1 (A) and Experiment 2 (B). The main effect of age group, decision task and 
their interaction are significant at p < .05. 95% confidence intervals are represented in the 
figure by the error bars attached to each column.  
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Figure 4. Mediation model estimating the effect of age on decision performance via memory 
ability and cue recall in the decision task with high memory demand. Figure contains standardized 
coefficients for each experiment. *** significant at p < .001, ** significant at p < .01, * significant 
at p < .05.  
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Appendix  
 
The materials of the decision tasks (trials and objects) were designed such that the 
decision trials distinguish between compensatory (TALLY) and noncompensatory (TTB) 
decision making. First, we selected five cue patterns (each representing a job candidate) 
consisting of five binary cues each. To do this, we created all possible sets of five candidates 
with five binary cues and computed their predictions for TALLY and TTB. We then chose 
those five candidates for which the number of trials discriminating between these two 
strategies as largest (where the two strategies would make opposing predictions). Table A1 
shows the final cue patterns of the five decision objects. Table A2 shows the resulting 
comparisons as well as the predictions of TALLY and TTB. Because WADD is a similar 
decision strategy that makes slightly different predictions for some of the resultant trials, we 
also modeled this strategy besides the additional models capturing guessing and 
idiosyncratic decision strategies. 
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Table A1  
Cue Patterns of the Five Decision Objects  
 
Object Cue 1 Cue 2 Cue 3 Cue 4 Cue 5 
1 – + + + + 
2 + + – – – 
3 + – – – – 
4 – – – – – 
5 – – + + + 
 
Note. + Positive cue direction; – Negative cue direction. 
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Table A2  
Choice Predictions (i.e. Object 1 or Object 2) for the Weighted-Additive Strategy (WADD), 
the Tallying Strategy (TALLY), and the Take-the-Best Strategy (TTB)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. Given the cue patterns and validities (see Table A1), each model predicts that either 
object 1 will be chosen, that object 2 will be chosen, or that a choice will be made at random 
(?). The guessing model assumes random choice on each trial (equal to a probability of .5 of 
choosing each of the alternatives. 
Trial Object 1 Object 2 WADD TALLY TTB Guess 
1 1 2 1 1 2 ? 
2 4 5 2 2 2 ? 
3 2 3 1 1 1 ? 
4 4 3 2 2 2 ? 
5 1 5 1 1 1 ? 
6 5 2 2 1 2 ? 
7 3 1 2 2 1 ? 
8 4 2 2 2 2 ? 
9 5 3 1 1 2 ? 
10 4 1 2 2 2 ? 
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